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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In the United States there is a common proverb “don’t bite the hand that feeds you.” This 
proverb allows for some insight into the culture of the American people and shows the respect 
that is often given to those who provide for us. In Appalachian Kentucky this proverb is often 
extended to one’s place of employment. For Appalachian Kentucky this sign of respect and trust 
empowered the coal industry. The people of the region do recognize that an unchecked extractive 
industry such as coal can cause social and environmental problems. Yet, they live with the 
problems because, for most of the region, the coal industry offers the best wages and until 
recently had been the largest employer. This grin-and-bear it attitude not only comes from a 
strong sense of pride in one’s work but also the fact that in the past workers who have spoken out 
against the coal companies have been fired or worse, blacklisted from the entire industry (Eller 
1982). By the late 1960s as part of President Johnson’s Great Society, the Appalachian Regional 
Commission (ARC) was created as a Federal agency, tasked with funding and providing support 
for the redevelopment of the region (ARC 2010). It was now up to the ARC to sort out the best 
way to improve the region. 
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The ARC or any other agency organizing development must address all of the issues that 
affect that region, no matter how difficult they are to deal with. In the case of Appalachian 
Kentucky, coal companies claim that their investments brought modernization and the modern 
American consumer culture to the region (Eller 1982). This claim allowed the companies to cast 
themselves as saviors. In the last 120 years, statements such as the one above create a discourse 
for Appalachia, which claims that the region is unable to develop on its own and is in need of 
help. In re-examining coal and the coal industry’s impact on the region, one can begin to 
understand some of the reasons why poverty is present in the region.  
 This re-examination of coal’s impact is the starting point for a study of the ARC. This 
analysis offers a chance to bring the ARC back to the treatment of the causes of poverty and not 
the symptoms of it. The ARC has done some good for the region by constructing new roads and 
implementing social programs and reforms (Eller 2008). However, all of these advancements are 
built upon sand. The sand in Appalachian Kentucky is the fantasy of a stable region. In 
Appalachian Kentucky, the coal industry is still a major employer but is prone to a boom and bust 
cycle that can and has left whole communities economically depressed (Eller 1982). With this 
being said, the services and jobs brought in by the ARC may never fill the void left by the coal 
industry. In order to close the scars of the coal industry, the coal industry’s impact on the region 
must not be buried but closely analyzed in order to rise above boom and bust economic cycles. 
By including coal and the coal industry in the analysis of poverty in Appalachian Kentucky, the 
policies or programs created to eliminate poverty will have a greater chance of success. The 
following section explains the background of the ARC and how the agency was set up to develop 
the region. 
 
 
3 
 
1.2 Background on the Appalachian Regional Commission 
In 1963 President Kennedy formed the President's Appalachian Regional Commission 
(PARC). Within two years the work of the PARC provided Congress with the needed information 
to pass the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA). With the passing of the ARDA the 
PARC’s job was done and President Johnson officially formed the ARC as a Federal agency 
under the umbrella of the Great Society (ARC 1968). 
 In 1965 Congress designed the ARDA to advance the effort to narrow the economic and 
social gap between Appalachia and the rest of the country, making the need to migrate out of the 
region for economic opportunity unnecessary (ARC 1966, 1967, 1968). The ARC’s primary goals 
are: 
• To make recommendations, on programs and projects. 
• To develop on a continuing basis comprehensive and coordinated plans and 
programs.  
• To provide expert technical assistance to the States in their implementation of 
the Appalachian program.  
• To serve as a focal point of coordination of Federal and State efforts in 
Appalachia.  
• To sponsor, and initiate research on problems facing the region (ARC 1966, 7).  
 
From its foundation the ARC has had lofty goals for the region. However, the ARC did 
foresee that without a new administrative system in the region, this experiment in “creative 
federalism” would quickly fail (ARC 1966, 1). In order to foster intergovernmental cooperation 
and to limit corruption, the ARC’s first task was to get all three levels of government (local, state, 
and federal) thinking on the same plane. Without the ARC’s guidance, the funds provided by the 
ARDA would have been split between local, state, and federal governments and might have been 
squandered. The founding of the ARC saw the creation of an unprecedented level of 
intergovernmental cooperation (ARC 1968, 3). In the last 47 years the ARC’s ability to foster 
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communication and cooperation among all levels of government has become a lasting 
contribution to regional development.  
If unprecedented intergovernmental cooperation is the ARC’s great achievement then the 
ARC’s inability to balance road and non-road (social programs) funds is one of its greatest 
drawbacks (Estall 1982). Once it is pointed out that road funds have been more plentiful than 
non-road funds, the list of goals above takes on a new meaning. This is because the goals for the 
ARC in 1966 were vague at best. This has left room for interpretation and with limited funds in 
the 1980s, the development of the road and highway system took precedence over most non-road 
projects. This was seen as the most practical way to develop the region but it left the cultural and 
social problems on the table.  
 In sum, the ARC has provided a foundation for cooperation and that needs to be 
recognized. However, the fact that the ARC still provides more funding for roads than non-road 
project needs to be addressed (ARC 2010). By far, the ARC has achieved more in Appalachia 
than any other organization but there are still holes that need to be filled. The literature review 
addresses other theories of development that have been applied to Appalachia as well as their 
developmental impacts. The literature review also covers coal’s impact on the region’s 
development. However, first I review my research questions. 
1.3 Research Questions  
This project works from the premise that the ARC has not kept coal in mind while 
creating development policies, thereby not solving the problem of poverty and instead just 
masking it. A second premise is that coal is a major predictor of poverty and that coal-producing 
counties experience more migration than the surrounding non coal-producing counties. These 
premises guide the questions below and will help better understand poverty in Appalachian 
Kentucky.  
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Question 1: What is coal’s place in the ARC’s discourse of development and how has it changed 
over time?  
Question 2: Can a measure of coal production provide the needed analytical power to explain the 
coal industry’s impact on Appalachian Kentucky? 
Question 3: Could the instability of the coal industry be a leading cause for poverty and migration 
out of the region between 1980 and 2000?  
 The culmination of these questions is the ability to better answer why there is still 
poverty in Appalachian Kentucky. The above questions are meant to provide balance a between 
qualitative and quantitative methods in order to analyze the relationship between poverty and coal 
in Appalachian Kentucky. This balance is needed because individually these questions do not 
provide as full a picture of why there is poverty. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
When fighting an adversary as insidious as poverty it is easy to lose sight of the reasons 
why the “war” was started in the first place. In order to bring the “war on poverty” (Bradshaw 
2002) back into perspective, one needs to re-examine the Appalachian region. The first part of 
this review covers how scholars have treated various forms of development from the early 
twentieth century to the present. By providing a brief review of current arguments and praises for 
the various forms of development that have been applied in Appalachia, I can then continue with 
a deeper analysis of the ARC. In this chapter I also examine works that look at poverty and coal 
from different perspectives. The difference in these works is that they try not to narrowly define 
the causes of the current poverty in the region but instead take a more historical look at persistent 
poverty. Next, I examine the available literature on the coal industry and its impact on the region. 
In doing this I am able to understand how current and past scholars have treated coal’s influence. 
By combining a look at past development theories in Appalachia and how coal impacts the 
region, I am able to see if these past development theories are explaining coal’s impact on the 
region, or if it is overlooked.  
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2.2 Development and Its Ever-Changing Face in Appalachia 
There is no clear agreement among scholars as to which theory of development best 
explains or applies to Appalachia. Among the many theories applied to Appalachia, two stand out 
as the most widely used. The first theory is the Culture of Poverty. The Culture of Poverty is a 
theory that claims that poverty is a trait that is passed down through generations of people who 
are unable and unwilling to rise above their poverty. This sense of marginalization and 
helplessness leads to the idea that the current social/political/economic systems do not serve one’s 
needs. This, in turn, ingrains a sense of futility in the population, completing the circle of the 
Culture of Poverty (Lewis 1998 [1963]). The second theory is Internal Colonization. This theory 
was designed as a response to the Culture of Poverty. It shows that the people themselves are not 
to blame but the coal companies, among other businesses, have directly shaped long-term poverty 
in the region (Eller 1982).  
By analyzing these two theories one can start to see different patterns of development and 
how that development shaped the region. Also one can learn of the mistakes and achievements of 
each of these theories. In the future as new theories are proposed and tested, development experts 
must keep in mind the mistakes of past regional planners so as to not repeat them.    
2.2.1 Culture of Poverty 
Oscar Lewis is credited with the formulation of the Culture of Poverty theory. Lewis 
(1998 [1963]) saw the Culture of Poverty as a subculture of modern middle class culture and this 
subculture was closed off from all other cultural systems. According to Lewis, if one was to 
eliminate physical poverty, the culture of poverty would persist because it is a way of life. 
No matter how much Lewis tries to say that poverty exists in every country, he still states 
that some people will never be in the Culture of Poverty because their “original” culture is too 
strong. Lewis stresses that a Jewish community in poverty would not develop a Culture of 
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Poverty because their tradition of literacy and their religion gave them a sense of identification. 
However, a Mexican or African community would develop a Culture of Poverty because they 
lacked a tradition of literacy and a unifying religion (1998 [1963], 7-8). This statement is biased 
because it stereotypes groups of people to be better than other groups of people. Lewis uses traits 
such as isolation, uncontrolled pride, loyalty to family, and feuding as the leading cause of the 
Culture of Poverty. Scholars, such as Jack Weller and Herbert Gans, looking for ways to explain 
poverty in Appalachia prior to the 1980s, were quick to use the Culture of Poverty because the 
traits above, according to these scholars, were abundant in Appalachia (Walls and Billings 2002). 
How a theory that is openly biased, and to some extent racist, can be widely accepted in 
academia is unclear. On the one hand, Culture of Poverty provided a simplistic answer to the 
question of why there is poverty, but blind acceptance of a theory is not acceptable. Over time the 
Culture of Poverty became widely criticized for those biases and its shallow analysis of why 
poverty exists. The Culture of Poverty’s analysis was shallow because it only looked at the 
aftermath of poverty and concluded that the people were to blame for the situation they lived in. 
This was only half of the story because time had washed away the other causes of poverty. A 
cycle of poverty could have existed but the cause might have been the loss of a major employer, 
overuse of natural resources, population decline, or a loss of economic diversity. To say that 
poverty was caused by isolation, uncontrolled pride, loyalty to family, and feuding, was to ignore 
other important economic, political, and institutional factors. 
For the past 30 years geographers and historians who specialize in Appalachia have been 
trying to say that Lewis’ Culture of Poverty has a middle-class bias and does not go beyond 
isolation, uncontrolled pride, loyalty to family, and feuding to explain poverty in Appalachia. 
This middle-class bias treats people who are from lower classes as victims of their own creation, 
trapped in a cycle that they cannot escape. A middle-class way of life was privileged and seen as 
a norm shared by society (Jackson 1989a). By applying the Culture of Poverty to Appalachia, one 
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assumes that Appalachians comprise a homogeneous lower class of people who have no chance 
of ever breaking the cycle of poverty and therefore have given up hope of economic 
improvement. In this way, culture is seen to have its own driving force. This superorganic form of 
culture is the problem. By allowing culture to have in a sense “agency,” one can easily overlook 
other reasons for poverty (Duncan 1980). This overt cultural determinism and class bias helped to 
discredit the Culture of Poverty (Duncan 1980, Jackson 1989a).  
Duncan (1980) shows that viewing culture as superorganic is just a form of cultural 
determinism. Such culturalism was seen by many to be the answer to the problems of 
environmental determinism (Semple 1901), but Jackson (1989b) and Duncan (1980), state that 
culturalism is still a form of determinism, just not environmental determinism. What is clear in 
Appalachia is that neither culture nor the environment alone explains why there is persistent 
poverty in the region. The one thing the Culture of Poverty leaves out is the institutions. People 
themselves may not cause their own poverty; they may have help from institutions in charge of 
their well-being or development. 
2.2.2 Internal Colonization 
 In the 1980s a challenge to the Culture of Poverty’s dominance as a way of thinking 
about Appalachia began to emerge. One of the leaders of this challenge is Ronald Eller. Eller’s 
(1982) work is rooted in the theory of Internal Colonization. However, Eller was not the first to 
state a need for change, just the person to start the Internal Colonization movement. From the 
beginning, Eller emphasized that Appalachians were isolated and had kin-based networks, just 
like the rest of rural America at the turn of the twentieth century. In contrast to the Culture of 
Poverty theory, the theory of Internal Colonization shows that it was not the people or their social 
structure that led to poverty, but instead the industrialization and modernization brought by 
outside companies (1982). Eller writes that as the coal companies advanced deeper into the 
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mountains they left the land scarred and barren, covered by a black residue of coking ovens, coal 
tipples, and slag piles (1982,199). Since Appalachia offered few established communities, the 
coal companies became “feudal lords of closed company towns in which mountaineers exchanged 
their traditional independence for an existence characterized by dependency, powerlessness, and a 
lack of autonomy” (Eller 1982, 199). Quotes such as this, show that Appalachia was being 
restructured as an internal colony, at least in the view of some.    
 One problem with the Internal Colonization theory is that its main goal is to show that 
external companies and pressures are the cause of many the region’s problems and that the people 
are victims of exploitation (Billings and Blee 2000). This is a problem because it only sees the 
outside companies as detrimental and does not see the good they brought. Also, the Internal 
Colonization theory does not show any internal problems that could have led to poverty (Billings 
and Blee 2000). Since the Internal Colonization theory was the first theory of Appalachian 
development after the Culture of Poverty theory, the “us” vs. “them” mentality is understandable. 
This type of knee-jerk reaction is not unprecedented in the U.S. As previously discussed, a similar 
reaction can be seen in geography when environmental determinism passed from favor and the 
Berkley School’s cultural geography took its place (Jackson 1989b).  
These criticisms aside, Eller (1982) allowed the greater American public to see a 
dimension of Appalachian poverty that had been hidden for years. With the theory of Internal 
Colonization Eller (1982) was able to jump-start research in Appalachia. Eller’s (1982) book is 
significant because it marks the starting point for Appalachian development research.  
As time passed scholars began to analyze and expand on Eller’s (1982) work. Paul 
Salstorm (1994) is one such scholar. At the heart of Salstorm’s (1994) argument is the Internal 
Colonization theory, but he takes it in a different direction than Eller (1982). Salstorm (1994) 
explains that since the mid-nineteenth century Appalachia has been increasingly vulnerable to 
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capitalist development. However, the new industries are not the sole cause of the region’s 
underdevelopment (Salstorm 1994, viii). Salstorm demonstrates that the trade and barter system 
and subsistence farming in Appalachia were strengthened by the extra wages that could be earned 
in the factory or the coal mine (viii). In time, both employer and employee became dependent on 
each other (Salstorm 1994). Salstorm provides this example from an early firebrick manufacturer 
in Eastern Kentucky: 
I cannot forget the loyal, able, and efficient workers I found in the district. They 
were not only willing to render good service but they proved to be the best 
friends I ever had… They were ready to come at any hour of the night or day and 
spurned the offer of pay. We will never forget the safety we felt among these 
mountaineers. (1994, 43) 
 
This dependency formed because of the trade and barter system in place in Appalachia. 
The trade and barter system grew out of practices that put voluntary reciprocity above contractual 
reciprocity (Salstorm 1994, 42). This voluntary reciprocity endeared the mountain worker to his 
or her employer and as long as the employer met their worker’s needs, the system worked fine 
(Salstorm 1994). Over time, as the employers took greater advantage of their loyal workers by not 
paying a fair wage or not providing other services, the workers rioted because their employers 
there not doing what the workers felt their labor morally obligated the company to provide 
(Salstorm 1994). This last statement allows one to see that unmet or different economic and social 
expectations can drive a region apart and affect development.   
Salstorm provides a new dimension to Eller’s internal colony. This new dimension allows 
a reader to see that the problem in Appalachia is not black and white or “us” vs. ‘”them” but 
much more complex. Therefore, one must keep in mind that Appalachia’s problems may have 
been shaped in varying degrees by both locals and the outside companies. 
The Internal Colonization for Appalachia was not theorized until after the founding of the 
ARC. However, the founders and proponents of the ARC did not completely accept the Culture 
12 
 
of Poverty theory as the theory that would be used to develop the region. One such proponent was 
John Friedmann (1966). The spirit of Friedmann’s six-stage development plan seems to have 
been to integrate Appalachia with the surrounding regions and the national economy. For 
example, some of his stages included sub-region specific economic development plans and a call 
for the active support of the local population. This support would continue the changes, once the 
initial funding and national/state support ended. Overall, Friedmann questioned the determinist 
nature of the Culture of Poverty and argued that a balanced plan for economic development based 
on integration is desirable (1966).  
2.3 Developmental Impacts 
 After looking at both the Culture of Poverty and Internal Colonization it becomes clear 
that Appalachia is in need of a middle ground that provides a balance between the individual and 
the company. The Culture of Poverty theory is no longer accepted as a developmental theory, by 
the ARC, the people of the region, and Appalachian scholars, in Appalachia. However, language 
about Appalachian development that is reminiscent of the Culture of Poverty can still be found. In 
Appalachia today, theories on development tend to take into account internal colonization and 
governmental atrophy. This means that the Internal Colonization theory has been able to stay 
relevant by expanding over the years to include not only private development but also all forms of 
development that keep Appalachia a “sacrifice zone” (Purdy 2002, 214).        
 Purdy uses the premise of the Internal Colonization theory and adds a new layer of 
analysis. Purdy holds that the coal industry no longer makes up the majority of the Appalachian 
economy, yet it still has political impunity (2002, 214). Purdy’s twist on the Internal Colonization 
theory is the addition of laws and policies that are meant to manage the extraction of natural 
resources in the United States but instead contribute to the exploitation of the region (2002).  
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The law that has the most impact on Appalachia is the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (SMCRA). SMCRA was implemented in 1977 by the Carter Administration. 
SMCRA was intended to manage the expansion of strip-mining that was sweeping the United 
States by placing environmental regulation on the mines. SMCRA also required the coal 
companies to return the mine sites to their “approximate original contour.” However, a coal 
company is exempted from this rule if it made the land available for commercial or recreational 
uses (Purdy 2002, 209-210). 
 Purdy explains that between 1977 and 1980 President Carter’s Office of Surface Mining 
(OSM) was staffed with officials who made sure federal law was strictly enforced through a 
combination of field inspections and annual reviews of state programs (2002). Under President 
Carter, OSM inspectors shut down mines that violated SMCRA and irresponsible operators were 
fined. During this time, inspectors were met with periodic violence and a few inspectors were 
taken hostage by angry miners. In 1980 when the Reagan Administration took over, Reagan’s 
Interior Secretary James Watt appointed OSM administrators who had fought SMCRA in the 
courts (Purdy 2002, 211). This meant that over time OSM was no longer able to enforce SMCRA 
because it was staffed with officials who put profit above environmental enforcement. This trend 
continued into the 2000s.    
 The lax enforcement of SMCRA, according to Purdy, has led to people selling their 
homes and moving because of the strip-mining process (blasting, digging, and the amount of 
particulates in the air) (2002, 208-209). Purdy also shows that the wages and profits made on the 
extraction of coal in Appalachia came with a steep environmental cost. This environmental cost 
has made the region an accepted sacrifice, which enforces the image of Appalachia as an internal 
colony. 
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Purdy makes this observation: 
Citizens will have to insist that market prices and profit margins should not alone 
determine the shape of the country’s landscapes and communities. We will have 
to decide whether to maintain our comfort at the price of more sacrifice zones, 
with their dead towns and leveled mountains (2002, 214).  
 
This shows that Purdy not only wants the people of Appalachia to stand and say “the 
buck stops here,” but he also calls for the whole nation to rethink how we view regions with 
abundant natural resources. This call to not accept colonization and marginalization is a needed 
sentiment in order to muster national support of the renewed enforcement of SMCRA. With 
renewed enforcement SMCRA can start the cleanup of the region and help break the region’s 
dependency on corrupt enforcement laws and irresponsible employers.    
 In contrast with Purdy’s anti-strip-mining stance, Bradshaw (2002, 1985), claims that 
strip-mining benefits the region. In both works Bradshaw states that the ARC is providing the 
needed development to the region and that the economic situation in Appalachia has improved 
since 1965. The ARC has helped Appalachia recover from high poverty and low living 
conditions, but Bradshaw’s works only show the positive side of the ARC. By only showing the 
positives (increased housing, increased income, new water treatment plants, and so on) one 
cannot make a full assessment of the ARC. True balance comes when one can see the negative 
sides as well. Seeing the negative allows the public to evaluate the ARC, to see what programs 
and projects are working and which ones need to be reworked. Bradshaw states that by allowing 
the coal industry to grow, the ARC is increasing the economic power of the region. However, in 
2001 a report sponsored by the ARC shows that increased coal industry does not directly lead to 
increased economic power or jobs, because of increased mechanization and strip mining, both 
reducing the number of miners needed to maintain the same level of production (Roenker 2001). 
15 
 
Bradshaw claims that as the ARC developed Appalachia’s infrastructure, the coal 
industry, used this new set of roads to expand its surface mining operation in order to compete 
with the western coalfields (2002; 1985). This may be true, but Bradshaw only shows this as a 
positive and does not allow for any of the local problems that this expansion may cause. Strip-
mining expansion increases the likelihood of residents having to live with increased blasting, 
digging, and particulates in the air. Also, if the strip-mines expand close enough to a community, 
the residents may be forced to move because of the unsafe living conditions these problems 
cause. Bradshaw also states that “more strip-mining not only made it easier to return mined land 
to other uses because the mined land is now flat, but also meant that miners were earning better 
wages as skilled operators of machinery” (1985, 397).  
Yes, miners do earn a higher wage for operating machinery but underground mines are 
just as mechanized. Long gone are the days of picks and shovels. Plus, being underground makes 
the jobs more hazardous, therefore wages can be higher. Bradshaw claims that reclaimed mines 
are a source of flat land for economic development but what he does not state is what has been 
built on the land. Hospitals, industrial complexes, prisons, and airports have all been built on 
reclaimed mine sites but this only covers a few of the mines sites in Appalachia. For the most 
part, reclaimed mines are zoned for “wildlife and forest management,” yet little grows on these 
reclaimed mines and what can grow is nothing like the dense hardwood forest teaming with life 
that once thrived before the strip-mining process (Purdy 2002). 
Overall, Bradshaw’s works allow a reader to once again view Appalachia as an internal 
colony or as Purdy puts it a “sacrifice zone” (2002, 214). Bradshaw never mentions internal 
colony or sacrifice zone, but the trouble that he goes through to state that increased coal 
production was a major source of prosperity for Appalachia in actuality only serves to strengthen 
the toxic and unstable relationship between the coal industry and Appalachia. In the end, 
Bradshaw’s discussion of increased strip-mining decreases the effectiveness of his analysis of the 
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existence of the ARC itself and helps to highlight the fact that the region is still struggling with 
integration and cooperation.            
By 2003, the integration and cooperation that Friedmann (1966) called for had yet to be 
achieved. Glasmeier and Farrigan (2003) demonstrate that Appalachia is still significantly 
influenced by natural resource extraction. They point out that poor communities in a resource rich 
area tend to be engulfed by noxious economic activities that pollute the land, decrease home 
values, and threaten residents’ health (132). Their analysis of the region is in line with the Internal 
Colonization theory but at times their comments seem to play on stereotypes of the region, 
invoking the Culture of Poverty. They write:  
Driving along narrow valley bottoms, which parallel constantly shifting dendritic 
streambeds … It appears as if a great flood upstream scoured a landfill site and 
then scattered humanity's waste in every direction... All along the highway are 
heaps of human residue, plastic bottles, old tires, household appliances, broken 
toys, and abandoned cars. Sometimes the piles seem almost deliberately stacked 
to look their best, given the circumstances (Glasmeier and Farrigan 2003, 135).  
 
These generalizations may be derived from facts but one needs to avoid implying that all 
valleys in Central Appalachia are the same. This is because such generalizations can affix an 
image to a place that may reinforce stereotypes of the region.  
Also, as Glasmeier and Farrigan describe the development of Appalachia they state that 
Appalachia has been under the yoke of a single industry type for so long that the people of the 
region have a feeling of powerlessness and live in a culture of despair (2003, 134). Eller (1982) 
also makes similar statements, but Glasmeier and Farrigan (2003) seem only to give the negative 
aspects of the situation. Using the term “culture of despair” could lead one to think that since the 
people feel powerless then they do not want or try to change, reminiscent of the Culture of 
Poverty. Nevertheless, Glasmeier and Farrigan show that development in Appalachia is still 
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slowed by the level of primary industry present. This view allows one to begin to see primary 
industry (mainly coal) as a constraint on the region.     
2.4 Coal: A Social and Geographic Constraint  
For more than three generations, the coal industry has influenced life in Appalachia 
(Edwards et al. 2006). Over the years it has become second nature in Appalachia to live with the 
destruction of the landscape and to bend to the will of the coal companies (Lewis 1998). 
Nevertheless, this lifestyle is neither healthy nor widely accepted anymore.  During the industrial 
development of Appalachia, settlement patterns and lands rights were altered, not at the request of 
the local population but on the demand of big industry (Lewis 1998, Biggers 2006).  
Ronald Lewis (1998) shows that the widespread introduction of the railroad had the 
potential to bring wealth and development to the region. To do so, the railroad companies needed 
to connect not just large cities, timber camps, and coal mines but as many towns as possible. By 
interconnecting these small towns with the larger cities, county seats, and the rest of the nation, 
Appalachia could then become a truly integrated part of the United States. As Lewis shows, 
however, that did not happen. Railroads bypassed many small towns in Appalachia not because of 
the mountainous terrain but because of the whims of the railroad companies, which were 
sometimes controlled or owned by men of great power and local influence (Lewis 1998).  
In Randolph County, West Virginia for example, the railroad bypassed the county seat of 
Beverly in favor of Elkins (Lewis 1998). The railroad was owned by Senators Henry G. Davis 
and Stephen B. Elkins’ Coal and Coke Company. The coal company also sponsored raids of the 
courthouse in Beverly to steal the public records. These thefts continued for a few months until 
the courthouse in Beverly was burnt down. National newspapers picked up this story; however, 
the newspapers reported the story from Senators Henry G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins’ point of 
view (Lewis 1998).   
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What can be taken from this story is that personal gain and public gain do not necessarily 
go hand-in-hand. Lewis (1998) succeeds in showing that Senators Henry G. Davis and Stephen B. 
Elkins’ plans for development in Randolph County were not for the county’s growth but for the 
senators’ personal wealth. In turn, the railroad became a social and geographic constraint, instead 
of a social and geographic benefit. By drawing attention to personal greed, Lewis (1998) adds a 
new layer to the complexities of development in Appalachia. Now development is not just “us” 
vs. “them” but a question of increasing profit and how can we get away with it.  
Lewis (1998) shows that the region was not backward and violent. Occasional acts of 
violence did occur when people’s way of life was threatened by the coal and railroad companies. 
This occurred because Appalachians felt that the companies were obligated to support them 
because of the loyalty and service, they provided the companies. It appears that coal and railroad 
companies manipulated cultural traits of Appalachian people, to obtain their profits. These 
cultural traits were a sense of loyalty, pride in one’s work, and the willingness to help their fellow 
citizen. These traits are not exclusive to Appalachians, but the coal and railroad companies used 
them to their advantage. This resulted in a reorganized region built around an extractive economy. 
This reorganization constrained the region and allowed for the growth of coal company towns 
(Lewis 1998).     
As coal towns developed, the population started to move toward these new centers of 
growth. This migration gave the coal companies a labor force and the companies in return 
provided their workers with shelter, food, and manufactured goods. As the companies gained 
control they were able to rewrite the economies and culture of the region to suit their needs. The 
economy was rewritten in a way that replaced the barter and trade/low profit economy with a 
wage labor/high profit economy. However, the high profits did not go to the workers just the 
owners of the mines; these owners were often outsiders (Banks 1995). The culture was also 
changed by the introduction of wage labor. The coal companies also started to build schools, 
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health clinics, housing, movie theaters and various stores, which provided the people of the 
region with places to spend their new wages.  
By providing this social capital the coal companies were in effect buying the loyalty of 
their workers, which made them dependent on the coal company for nearly all of their day-to-day 
needs. Over time, the lure of high wages and modern comforts drew people off the ridge-tops and 
out of the small hollows. This migration was the final straw that ended self-sufficient farming in 
Appalachia (Eller 1982).    
People did leave their homes in the fashion stated above, but not all. For some the need to 
move was chosen for them. Coal companies did buy land in the region but most of the time they 
just bought the mineral rights under a “broad form deed.” These deeds were written in a way that 
the people of the mountains got to keep their land but the coal companies got the minerals under 
it. This kind of “upfront money” for minerals the people of Appalachia barely used was seen as a 
way to make a few extra dollars. Plus, the people got to keep their land and livelihoods. However, 
the broad form deeds included a clause that allowed the coal companies to extract the minerals in 
any manner they saw fit. This meant that if a farm was over a coal seam the company owned, the 
company had the right to evict the people from the land and mine the coal (Drake 2001). 
Drake (2001) provides another dimension of the migration story in Appalachia. The 
power of the coal companies was not just in what they offered in compensation and creature 
comforts but also in their ability to move whole communities in order to increase profits. Drake 
(2001) and Banks (1995) allow us to see that the coal companies were able to hide their push for 
profit under the guise of regional development and progress. This guise came in the form of 
social capital (roads, towns, hospitals, and school). This allowed the coal companies to gain the 
population’s trust and also the blessing of federal government, which in turn allowed the coal 
companies to increase their profits. One area that Drake (2001) and Banks (1995) do not touch on 
20 
 
is how strip-mining impacted the region. By not addressing strip-mining Drake (2001) and Banks 
(1995) are leaving out an important piece of Appalachia during the last 30 years.  
Wagner and Obermiller (2004) offer a look into the life of migrant workers that the coal 
industry provided for. According to Wagner and Obermiller, although new migrants came from 
the whole Appalachian region, most of them were from areas close to the new mines or company 
towns. By showing the highs and low of a boom and bust economy, Wagner and Obermiller 
(2004) are able to give a clear picture of life in a company town. They show that life was good 
but over time the coal companies, in order to maintain profits, cut off support for the towns, 
leaving the towns and their people, who were unaccustomed to running a town by themselves, all 
alone. This created a power vacuum that was filled by individuals unable to manage the needed 
changes, and so the region languished for years. By giving a firsthand account of how the region 
became poor and has stayed poor Wagner and Obermiller (2004) are able to show one reason why 
Culture of Poverty does not apply to Appalachia. They show instead that Appalachia was a region 
that became highly dependent on a single industry that was unable to provide long-term support 
for the social development of the area.   
Lorkin (1998) explains that the reorganization of the region, to center around coal, cut 
through all aspects of life. Lorkin states that in the 1930s it was not worth it to fight the growth of 
the coal companies because they owned the food and shelter the miners and local people used. 
Thus, the coal companies could control the movements and limit the rights of the locals (Lorkin 
1998, 81). Even as social movements in Appalachia gained support in the 1980s it was “difficult 
for them to gain legitimacy in the courts, because the justices are related to coal company owners 
by birth or deed” (Lorkin 1998, 81). With the law on the side of the companies, coal becomes an 
all-inclusive geographical constraint. This means that coal does not just affect the land but social 
and legal aspects of life in the region as well.  
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Today, an example of the tremendous legal and environmental leeway given to coal 
companies is the extreme version of surface mining, called mountain top removal (MTR). Erik 
Reece (2006) spent a year documenting the Lost Mountain mine site in Perry County, Kentucky. 
The devastation of the mountain itself was important in the book but it was not the main topic. 
Reece (2006) points out that from the moment MTR permits were issued, Lost Mountain became 
a restricted area. MTR is not only changing the physical landscape in the region but also the 
social relationship between the people and the coal companies (Reece 2006). By making Lost 
Mountain a restricted area MTR completely changed the way people use and view that area. By 
allowing the coal companies to have this power, people are at risk of losing their livelihoods and 
their areas of recreation. 
MTR is a geographic constraint because the mining process fills in headwater streams, 
disturbs groundwater flow, and destroys wildlife habitats (Reece 2006). As a social constraint 
MTR affects home values, alters living patterns, damages home and business foundations, and 
increases the rate of road repair. The main purpose of Reece’s book is to show how a MTR site 
can alter a landscape. In that respect Reece succeeds. However, Reece does not go deep enough. 
He raises a lot of questions but does not provide many answers. The reason for this could be that 
Reece is a journalist and the book was written in a journalistic style and not a scholarly research 
style. The fact still remains that this work has uncovered more side-effects of MTR and has 
signaled a renewed call for scholarly research on the impact of MTR, both geographically and 
socially (Reece 2006).  
In the same vein as Reece’s book, the documentary “Sludge” provides an analysis of 
MTR and its side-effects in Appalachia. Like Reece’s book, “Sludge” is intended for general 
knowledge and documents the Martin County, Kentucky coal slurry spill that occurred in October 
of 2000 (Salyer 2005). This spill was the largest man-made environmental disaster east of the 
Mississippi, until December 2008 when a coal fly ash slurry spill occurred at the Kingston Fossil 
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Plant (NASA 2008). The event was triggered by the rupture of a slurry pound that released 300 
million gallons of coal sludge into Coldwater and Wolfe Creeks (Salyer 2005). The Martin 
County coal slurry spill was 30 times larger than the wreck of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska 
(Salyer 2005).  
It took six months for the New York Times to run a story about the Martin County spill, 
and that story was buried deep in the paper. Martin County Coal (a subsidiary of Massey 
Industries) was fined but the fine was reduced 90% to $5,200. This was not the first time that 
Martin County Coal's slurry pond broke. It ruptured in 1994 and released 100 million gallons of 
slurry (Salyer 2005).  
Both “Sludge” and Lost Mountain demonstrate that the issues illustrated by Purdy (2002) 
are still current and in need of increased scholarly attention. “Sludge” and Lost Mountain show 
that Appalachia is indeed treated as a sacrifice zone, and OSM and SMCRA are unable to change 
this situation. With these two works and others like them in hand, researchers have the tools 
needed to inform the rest of the United States on the issues in Appalachia. This is because 
“Sludge” and Lost Mountain are in popular media styles (documentary and novel), but they have 
a scholarly slant. Researchers can harness this media and follow them up with scholarly texts in 
order to raise awareness about Appalachia. 
2.5 Conclusions  
This literature review has covered the background of the ARC, the changing development 
of Appalachia and the theories that have driven it, and how coal is a social and geographic 
constraint. This literature review provides a guidepost to the rest of the thesis. The literature 
review shows that there is a need to address why Appalachia is seen as a sacrifice zone and to 
expand the scholarly research on areas that have been covered by popular media sources. I this 
literature review, I have shown that Appalachia can be and is covered from many angles. 
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However, research in Appalachia tends to occur in clusters and these clusters are strung out over 
time. This means that in Appalachia there is a need for continuing research. By providing 
constant research the region and its people can start to be seen as more than poor, isolated, 
mountain folk. Just as continuing research and documentation changed commonly held feelings 
of all sharks being bloodthirsty killers, increased and balanced coverage of Appalachia will 
provide a starting point for changing the longstanding stereotypes and current economic situation.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to better understand the 
relationship between coal and poverty in Appalachia. The three questions that structure the 
research are restated below.  
Question 1: What is coal’s place in the ARC’s discourse of development and how has it changed 
over time?  
Question 2: Can a measure of coal production provide the needed analytical power to explain the 
coal industry’s impact on Appalachian Kentucky? 
Question 3: Could the instability of the coal industry be a leading cause for poverty and migration 
in the region between 1980 and 2000? 
3.2 Qualitative Questions  
My first research question involves a thematic discourse analysis. Discourse is defined as 
“a particular form of language with its own rules and conventions and the institutions within  
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which the discourse is produced and circulated” (Rose 2007, 142). Discourses can be expressed 
through countless types of visual and verbal images and texts, and also through the practices that 
those languages permit (Rose 2007, 142). As an institution, the ARC sets the region’s boundaries 
and establishes it sub-regions, the accepted history of the region, the key areas of interest in the 
region, and the social and economic needs of the region. By doing so, the ARC has constructed 
certain discourses that define how and what people think about Appalachia. 
Based on my readings, coal is a subject that the ARC touches on, but the ARC seems to 
maintain a distant relationship with coal. Conducting a thematic discourse analysis will allow me 
to examine the context in which coal is discussed. Understanding this context will permit me to 
gauge how important coal is to the ARC and how coal is treated in relation to the development of 
Appalachia. A discourse analysis is valuable in a geographical study such as this because the 
ARC discourse over the past 40 plus years has defined the public interpretation of Appalachia. 
The discourse has determined where the Appalachian region is and what is said about the people 
of the region themselves.   
To answer Question 1, I analyze texts published by the ARC itself. The texts are intended 
to enable a thematic discourse analysis. The texts I am using are ARC annual reports. Since these 
reports have been produced every year, there are 47 years of data. Thus, I decided to use three 
reports per whole decade, in order to get a broad sample instead of using all 47 annual reports. I 
do not use annual reports from 1966-1969 because all of the sixties are not represented. Also, I 
alternate between every other odd and every other even year in order to get three annual reports 
per decade and to have a few back-to-back years to judge repetitiveness in the writing of the 
annual reports. The years I use are: 1971, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2000, 
2004, and 2008. 
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By using ARC annual reports for my thematic discourse analysis I obtain my information 
about the ARC directly from the ARC. The ARC itself is the best source for this kind of discourse 
analysis. The annual reports provide a good framework of what the ARC plans for the region and 
what has been accomplished. This set of texts provides the clearest look at the ARC’s discourse 
and its change or continuity over time.  
To carry out a thematic discourse analysis, I follow the six phases of thematic discourse 
analysis. The six phases are: know your data, formulate codes, search for themes, review themes, 
define and name themes, and produce a report (Braun and Clarke 2006, 87). Also since some 
themes emerged as I read the texts, I added them to my list of themes (Singer and Hunter 1999). 
This method is less common but it enables the researcher to incorporate significant themes that 
might have otherwise gone unnoticed (Braun and Clarke 2006, 86). The data extracts that I used 
to code my themes are in Appendix A.1. 
This thematic discourse analysis allows me to see how coal is represented. For example, 
is coal viewed as a resource, as a social and geographic constraint, or as both? It is important to 
know the place of coal in the discourse of the ARC if we are to understand approaches and 
philosophies that guide the region’s development and to what extent they have changed over 
time. This analysis paves the way for questions 2 and 3.      
3.3 Quantitative Questions 
In the following sections I set up questions 2 and 3. These two questions stem from the 
questions above but allow me to focus more specifically on a single area of Appalachia. 
Questions 2 and 3 will allow me to see if the levels of coal production in Appalachian Kentucky 
offer some explanation to the poverty and migration in the region.       
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3.3.1 Data and Data Manipulation  
In order to answer both questions 2 and 3 I needed to choose a time period in which to 
start my search for data. In choosing a time period, I tried to keep in mind the start date of the 
ARC, which was 1965, and estimate how long it would have taken for the ARC to be well 
established in the region (ARC 2010). Also, the Central Appalachian region experienced a boom 
in the coal industry in the 1970s that carried through to the mid-1980s (ARC 2010). With these 
facts in hand, I chose a three decadal time period. This means that I use three datasets consisting 
of the same type of data. The only thing that changes is whether the data are from 1980, 1990, or 
2000. By choosing a three decadal time period I am able to show the impact of coal in a decade 
that coal had a positive impact (1980), and I am then able to show the long term effects of that 
boom in the other two decades. In order to populate my dataset various data sources were used. A 
list of these sources can be found in Appendix A.2. Below I list the variables used in each of my 
datasets (1980, 1990, and 2000).  
Dependent Variable 
1. Poverty Rate  
Independent Variables 
1. Tons of coal per person in poverty  
2. Coal Severance Tax receipts  
3. Median Age  
4. Net Migration Rate  
5. Percent of the population with a high school diploma or higher  
6. Per Capita Income  
7. Unemployment Rate 
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After completing the dataset, the next step was choosing the appropriate method for 
analysis. For this data I have chosen to use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) (Burt et al. 
2009). An OLS regression allows for the measurement of the strength of the causal relationship 
between the data. These measurements can then help understand or gain insight on data 
correlations why. However, OLS does come with a few assumptions that need to be met before 
analysis can began. First, there needs to be homogeneity of variance. This assumption states that 
the variance of a population from which different samples are taken must be equal. Second, all 
data values must be independent from one another. Third, the regression must fit the data. This 
means that since OLS is a linear model, the data must also be linear. Lastly, the error terms must 
be normally distributed (Burt et al. 2009, 472-475; Montello and Sutton 2006, 167-168). By 
meeting these assumptions there is greater confidence in the validly of the results. 
Since OLS is a global analysis method, I have also conducted analysis at the local level. 
One reason to conduct local level analysis is that local analysis allows you to see differences 
between the subunits of a study area instead of one measurement for the whole study area 
(Fotheringham et al. 2000, 93). This means that a regression analysis gives one result for the 
whole study area. A local analysis breaks the study area down to the smallest spatial unit 
provided (in the case of this study the smallest spatial units are counties). By looking at the local 
level I will be able to see if there are spatial clusters around the counties that have coal. There are 
several local analysis models to choose from but for this project I have chosen to use only one. 
The method that I have chosen is Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA). I selected this 
method because LISA is the clearest and most straight forward method, for me and this project 
(Fortin and Dale 2009). By adding local statistics I am able to offer a rounded analysis of my 
study area and data, which in turn provides more detailed results.  
 By applying these two quantitative methods I am able to see if the ARC needs to take a 
closer look at coal’s impact on the region. With question 2 and 3 I feel that I am able to provide a 
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starting point in analyzing coal’s place in the ARC on a quantitative level. Also, questions 2 and 3 
provide balance to the answers found when asking question 1.  
3.3.2 Study Area 
 Appalachia is a region that has been defined and redefined many times over the last 
hundred and twenty years. The problem with the Appalachian region is that it is sometimes 
defined by its physical, political, social, economic characteristics, or by a combination of all of 
four. Today, the leading definition of the Appalachia region is the definition set by the ARC. The 
ARC definition is one that combines all four previous definition types. The ARC defines the 
region as 205,000 square miles in area, which includes all of West Virginia and parts Alabama, 
Kentucky, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. This definition of Appalachia encompasses 421 
counties and includes 23.6 million people, or about eight percent of the U.S. population (ARC 
2010). This definition gives the region tangible geographic shape but is not limited to just the 
spine of the Appalachian Mountains or the central region around West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Virginia, and Tennessee. One drawback to the ARC’s definition is that poverty is a main source 
of consideration for inclusion (Eller 2008). This means that some of the 13 states were allowed to 
include counties that were not traditionally thought of as Appalachian counties because of their 
economic status (Eller 2008). The same can be said of counties that are traditionally defined as 
Appalachian counties but are left out because of a stronger economic situation (Eller 2008).  
 After careful consideration it is clear that for questions 2 and 3 the ARC definition of 
Appalachia is the best fit. This is because it provides a solid geographic base and provides 
flexibility by including Appalachian Plateau counties as well. Appalachian Plateau counties are 
needed because questions 2 and 3 focus on Appalachian Kentucky. Appalachian Kentucky 
includes 55 eastern counties that the ARC has designated “Appalachian.” I have chosen Kentucky 
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because of the high concentration of coal mining and the availability of coal production rates, 
coal severance tax numbers, and other coal-related data. Also, the ARC’s definition of the region 
closely fits the coal regions of Kentucky and the ARC provides detailed data at the county level 
for all of the counties in Appalachian Kentucky. Figure 1 below provides a map of the 
Appalachian sub-regions (ARC 2010). The red outline denotes the study area. 
Figure 1: Appalachian Regional Commission Sub-regions  
 
  
31 
 
From a quantitative standpoint, the region of Appalachian Kentucky meets the 
requirements for any statistical quantification (Burt et al. 2009). First, the study area is greater 
than thirty spatial units and is contiguous (Burt et al. 2009; McGrew and Monroe 2006, 110). 
Lastly, the error terms show a normal distribution; these results are found in section 5.3 (Burt et 
al. 2009).  
3.4 Conclusions 
 I feel that by using both a qualitative and quantitative analysis I am able to explain coal 
and its relationship with the ARC and Appalachian Kentucky better than if I were to just use one 
approach. Data sources for all following sections are included in the reference section. This is 
accomplished by using a thematic discourse analysis to uncover the themes behind the ARC’s 
management of the region and specifically how the ARC manages coal. Also, by providing a 
variable analysis, an OLS regression, and a LISA analysis I provide a quantitative angle to 
support the qualitative finding. This allows me focus on my questions and in the end form 
stronger conclusions.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ANALYZING THE ARC’S DISCOURSE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The intent of this chapter is to answer the question: “what is coal’s place in the ARC’s 
discourse of development and how has it changed over time?” By answering this question I 
provide insight into the nature and the strength of the ARC’s commitment to addressing coal in 
the quest to improve Appalachia. Also, this question provides a foundation in addressing whether 
coal’s instability and level of production impacts poverty and migration in Appalachian 
Kentucky.    
 In this thematic discourse analysis I use twelve annual reports. I have done this for the 
purposes of manageability because the ARC spans 47 years. I have spaced the twelve annual 
reports in order to obtain three reports per decade. The years I have chosen are: 1971, 1975, 1979, 
1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2008.     
 During my analysis I identified four themes. These themes fall into two distinctive time 
periods: time period 1, 1971-1980 and time period 2, 1984-2008. What makes these time periods 
different is the content that is found in the annual reports. 
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Time period 1 coincides with the early stage of ARC development and there are two 
prominent themes at work. These themes are that isolation and the road network have set the 
region apart, and energy investment brings coal center-stage but coal is not the only cause of 
Appalachia’s economic fluctuation. The discourse in time period 1 uses Appalachia’s past to help 
develop a plan for the present. In this time period there is very little future planning outside of 
road network development and new energy and manufacturing jobs. Also, this during this time 
the ARC is greatly affected by the national energy crisis. As a result, this time period focuses on 
coal development. This focus on coal is a driving force on the ARC’s discourse between 1971 
and 1980.  
The discourse in time period 2 invokes two themes that are vastly different from the 
themes covered in time period 1. These themes are community involvement and economic 
diversification. The shift to these themes indicates wholesale shift in priorities in the ARC. The 
shift shows that the ARC no longer invests large amounts of time and money on the past 
developmental issues of Appalachia. Instead the ARC turns its focus on development of 
education, telecommunication infrastructure, and community involvement (1984). In general the 
ARC discourse emphasizes investment in Appalachia’s present and future needs and pays little 
attention to past issues in Appalachian development.  
This shift in priorities in ARC’s annual reports was abrupt, and there is little in the annual 
reports themselves to explain the shift. In light of this shift, my analysis is two-staged. In the 
following sections I outline all four themes. Then I elaborate on the two time periods and describe 
why the development in each pair of themes is different. This shift in priorities made analysis 
difficult but informative.    
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4.2 Isolation and the Road Network 
 As the title of this section suggests, overcoming isolation and building a road network are 
main concerns of the ARC. However, before proceeding, the reason why isolation and a poor 
road network existed must be addressed. These reasons come directly from the ARC’s annual 
reports.  
 According to the ARC “the people that settled in Appalachia were, by and large, a stern 
people accustomed to hardship and eager to find freedom and a new home” (1975, 5). With this 
quote the ARC is showing that the people in Appalachia were seeking a separate and different life 
from that of their homelands. At first glance, this is not any different from why people came to 
America in the first place. What makes the people in Appalachia different (according to the ARC) 
is that these people decided to stay in the mountains. The ARC states that “people stayed in the 
mountains because there they weren’t answerable to any government or hemmed in by too many 
people” (1979, 2). One can understand that being free to live your life the way you want to be is a 
goal for most people. However, the ARC in these quotes makes the freedom to live free from 
excessive government control, an alien concept to a nation that was founded on that very same 
idea. What makes these quotes even more confusing is that the ARC says that the Appalachian 
people did fight for the United States in the Revolutionary War, the Indian Wars (before and after 
the Civil War), they fought on both sides of the Civil War, and volunteered in large numbers in 
every other conflict the United States was involved in (1975). By stating that the Appalachian 
people did answer the nation’s call to arms in every major conflict, the ARC shows that the 
people of the region were answerable to a government and were willing to die for this country. So 
why is isolation pushed by the ARC? Isolation appears to be pushed because of the myth of the 
mountain barrier (ARC 1971).  
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 According to the ARC, “no analysis of the regional problem has failed to identify the 
historic and persisting barrier-effect of its mountain chains as a primary factor in Appalachian 
underdevelopment” (ARC 1971, 41). According to this line of reasoning, Appalachia was 
doomed from the time of its settlement because of the mountains. However, people did settle in 
the Appalachian Mountains.  
Also, the ARC does not mention any development that may have taken place when the 
first settlers arrived. This development included roads, a postal system, churches with circuit 
riding preachers, a judicial system with circuit riding judges, and community markets (Eller 
1980). The ARC’s response is that, “limited access to the region discouraged new investments 
because the narrow, winding roads distorted time-distance travel, inhibiting potential industrial 
developers because of the problems involved in getting products to market” (1975, 6).  
By clinging to this idea of limited access, the ARC in effect promotes the view that the 
region was separate from the rest of the country. So, by building an integrated highway system, 
the ARC hopes to connect the region and improve Appalachia’s situation (ARC 1979). The ARC 
explains that this is needed because “narrow twisting roads have limited Appalachian’s social and 
cultural horizons and their access to education, health care, and other vital services, and also 
discouraged new industrial development of any kind” (ARC 1979, 4). A new highway system has 
benefited the region but the way in which the ARC states this blends cultural determinism and 
environmental determinism.  
 The ARC claims that isolation in Appalachia was created by the mountains, by the lack 
of modern highways to connect the region with the rest of the country, and by the population’s 
pride, independence, and skepticism. What is strange about this is that the ARC is blending the 
theories of cultural determinism, derived from the Culture of Poverty, and environmental 
determinism. This blending is improbable because these two theories were, and are still, 
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theoretical opposites. However, the ARC is able to use both of them to paint Appalachia as set 
apart from the rest of the country and in need of help. The environment can and does affect 
human development but the ARC claims that the environment completely cut off all development 
in the region. As shown in section 2.4, the discussion on coal as a social and geographic 
constraint, this was not the case. It appears that the ARC, despite its contributions to greater inter-
governmental cooperation, took a conventional view of the region, which at times is anti-
Appalachian. In addition, the ARC’s analysis of isolation barely mentions the fact that the region 
was developed by the coal industry. The coal industry did invest in roads and rail lines to connect 
the region with national markets. By the lack of information on past development, the ARC 
seems to be focusing on the stereotypical image of Appalachia, which shows the region as a place 
untouched by time and if development existed it was fleeting.  
 Careful consideration of this statement “no analysis of the regional problem has failed to 
identify the historic and persisting barrier-effect of its mountain chains as a primary factor in 
Appalachian underdevelopment,” reveals that it can be seen in two ways (ARC 1971, 41). First, 
one can claim that since all past analysis shows that the barrier-effect is a primary factor in 
Appalachian underdevelopment, then that is the main cause of poverty. The second way of 
understanding this statement is by acknowledging that the barrier-effect may limit development, 
but with money and determination development can happen. As an example, the coal industry 
achieved development in the region, albeit uneven development. In contrast to the ARC 
discourse, development did occur in the region before the ARC. This shows that the high cost of 
development does not limit development if the profits outweigh the costs. By using a discourse 
that portrays Appalachia as isolated and in need of help the ARC creates a mixed signal. This 
causes confusion and distrust, making it hard for the people of the region to fully endorse ARC 
programs and projects. This kind of discourse also misrepresents the region, leading to the 
acceptance of modern stereotypes of the region.  
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4.3 Energy Investment Brings Coal Center-Stage but Coal is not the Only Cause of Poverty in 
Appalachia 
 In the Appalachian Regional Development Act, energy investment, development, and 
production were not a priority and not included in the original goals of the ARC (ARC 1980). 
However, the energy crisis of the 1970s pushed these areas of interest in Appalachia to the 
forefront of national energy needs. By 1975 the ARC was amended by Congress, expanding its 
authority and responsibilities to include the investment in, the development of, and the production 
of energy resources. This new authority allowed the ARC to complete preliminary studies aimed 
at accommodating increased energy production (ARC 1980, 32). In the ARC’s own words; “in 
the current national energy situation, the Appalachian coal industry has once again become vitally 
important to the nation” (ARC 1975, 2). While the nation demanded more coal and other 
resources from Appalachia, the ARC held that the needs should be met in a way that allowed 
Appalachia to benefit economically and with few environmental side effects (ARC 1975). 
 It is true that the ARC called for a diverse energy plan. This plan involved coal but was 
open to alternative energy sources such as wind, hydroelectric power, and natural gas (ARC 
1980). In the 1970s and early 1980s large-scale implementation of these alternative forms of 
energy was in the developmental stages and coal, by virtue of its long history of use, became the 
only attainable choice. This is reflected when the ARC states that “given the national energy 
priority, coal continues to be a top regional priority” (1980, 35). In the annual reports the ARC 
stresses that the national energy crisis has given new life to the Appalachian coal industry and 
that in turn gave new life to the region. According to the dataset there are 147 data extracts; out of 
these data extracts 49 refer to the development of coal and 11 refer to the development of 
alternative energy sources. However, only 11 of the 49 of the development of coal extracts were 
addressed in the annual reports after 1984. This brief quantification of my data extracts shows 
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that the ARC did use the national energy crisis to work redevelopment of the coal industry into its 
discourse. 
4.3.1 Coal’s Impact on Appalachia’s Economy 
 The section above illustrates that the ARC saw coal as a means to bring new development 
to the region, as long as it was controlled by placing new environmental safeguards on mining 
and coal-fired power plants (ARC 1980). Yet, at the same time the ARC claims that;  
Coal alone was not responsible for the economic depression that beset the 
region. Rather, it was the coal “bust” in combination with significant and 
concurrent downturns in all major segments of the sub-regional economies that 
plunged Appalachia into so prolonged and devastating a decline (ARC 1980, 4).  
 
The coal bust that is mentioned in the data extract above took place in the 1950s and 
1960s, when coal prices bottomed out because of cheap oil. During this time Appalachians and 
businesses alike migrated out of the region. The above data extract is a problem because it says 
that coal is not the sole driver of the Appalachian economy but the ARC also holds that coal can 
save and restart the Appalachian economy. This divide is confusing and the use of phrases like 
these points to a discourse that is inconsistent, even contradictory, in its portrayal of coal. 
The following data extracts show the ARC is conflicted by scale. The ARC tries to 
address Appalachia as one region. However, the ARC does not show the sub-regional scale in the 
same detail. It appears that the ARC is too focused on regional image of Appalachia, that the sub-
regions become overlooked. By not providing a detailed analysis of its sub-regions the ARC has 
left the door open for this type of research. This study seeks to fill this gap in the research.  
Throughout the annual reports the ARC calls for “smart” development of coal in 
Appalachia. The ARC wants to develop coal in a way that is safe for the environment and the 
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people, as well as economically viable. However, with limited research at the sub-regional level 
the ARC is not addressing the goals its set in its discourse.  
First, the ARC claims that “Central Appalachia was hardest hit by the switch from coal to 
oil because of its unique dependence upon mining” (ARC 1980, 4). Secondly, the ARC states that 
“the most rugged, hard-to-reach part of the region, Central Appalachia, had never been able to 
build the economic diversity needed to withstand periodic downturns in its major industry” (ARC 
1980, 4). In the first quote “unique dependence upon mining,” shows that Central Appalachia is 
closely linked with the coal industry and the sub-region requires greater attention to 
diversification and sustainable coal development. The ARC must show they are willing to break 
the coal industry’s control of Central Appalachia’s economy; as of now its discourse is set to do 
just that but in practice it has not happened. In the second quote the ARC is placing considerable 
emphasis on environmental causes of the lack of economic diversity in Central Appalachia. The 
ARC does show that they feel the coal industry’s bust in Central Appalachia helped to drive the 
region into greater poverty but do not commit to it completely. This is because between 1971 and 
1984 the ARC’s discourse heavily favored the development of the coal industry. So when the coal 
industry started to bust once again, the ARC was, and still is, slow to recognize the economic loss 
in the coal mining sector. However, the ARC does states that “the mining industry has for many 
years been a major employer of Central Appalachian labor” (ARC 1975, 22) and that “most of the 
industry (coal) was controlled by “outside” interests, as well, so that little of the profit remained 
in the region” (ARC 1979, 3). These two quotes also show that prior to 1984 the ARC was using 
a version of the Internal Colonization Theory in its process of regional development. However, by 
1984 the ARC’s discourse shifted slightly and coal and energy development was minimized.  
During the energy crisis of the 1970s, two of the three Appalachian sub-regions and the 
rest of the nation experienced a recession. According to the ARC,  
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Central Appalachia did not respond negatively to the recession conditions of 
1970-71. Instead of stagnation or an employment decline during this period, 
Central Appalachia experienced a significant acceleration in growth, which 
continued throughout the more expansionary years of 1972-1973 (ARC 1975, 
22). 
 
To back up the quote above, the ARC states that Central Appalachia had “lost 7% of its 
population in the 1960s, but rebounded with the highest growth rate, of the three sub-regions, 
21%, in the 1970s.” Also, Central Appalachia had the lowest per capita personal income level in 
1965. Yet, between 1965 and 1979 Central Appalachia experienced the most rapid increase, 52 to 
71% of the U.S. average (ARC 1980, 6-7). According to the ARC, the gain in population and 
rising per capita personal income were great achievements. However, these achievements were a 
direct result of increased coal production and when that production ebbed in the 1980s so did the 
growth (ARC 1984). With this in hand, the ARC did not blame the failing economy in Central 
Appalachia on the decreased demand of coal. The ARC instead just did not explain why it 
happened at all. However, they did proceed to retool the agency.  
It appears that the ARC holds mixed feelings about the coal industry in Appalachia. The 
ARC wants to show that coal alone is not responsible for Appalachia’s problems but in my 
analysis, coal and the coal industry appear to have a large influence on Central Appalachia. This 
is because out of all the data extracts dealing with Central Appalachia nearly all of them deal with 
coal or the loss/gain of economic stability during the coal industry’s boom in the 1970s and bust 
in the 1980s. One can assume that the problems of one sub-region do not affect the other sub-
regions but doing so is claiming that there is no interaction between sub-regions. The ARC is 
correct in saying that many aspects of economic distress played into Appalachia’s decline but I do 
not agree with how the ARC addressed the problem. The ARC, in all its posturing, does not 
directly state that coal affects Central Appalachia, even though they have the required data. This 
tells me that the ARC in the 1970s was out to foster economic growth in the region at any cost, no 
41 
 
matter what was said about slow, clean, and sustainable growth. This became evident in the 1980s 
when nearly all the growth of the 1970s was lost, especially in Central Appalachia. 
During time period 1 the ARC discourse focused on energy development and correcting 
past problems, namely the region’s isolation. However, I found that the ARC’s language invokes 
a mix of Internal Colonization and the Culture of Poverty. This mix does appear to lean toward 
Internal Colonization but applying some of the commonly accepted views of Appalachia the ARC 
is not proactively changing the nation’s image of the region, just reinforcing it. By the end of the 
1970s and early into the 1980s the ARC continued this discourse, but by 1984 the ARC 
abandoned energy diversification in favor of economic diversification, this shift in explained in 
section 4.5.   
4.4 Community Involvement 
 Time period 2 starts in 1984. This time period marks a change in the ARC discourse. No 
longer are the annual reports written in a way that directly invokes the Culture of Poverty or 
Internal Colonization. Also, the ARC no longer includes detailed research on coal and other 
energy investment in its annual reports. Instead, the ARC turns to community involvement and 
economic diversification. 
Since 1984 the ARC has opened up to the communities that it serves. Instead of funding 
projects based on ARC studies alone, the ARC called for meetings and interviews with 
community members and civic leaders in order to tailor the ARC to better fit the communities it 
serves. By increasing openness to citizen participation, the ARC attempts to correct the confusion 
of its past programs and projects.  
 There are two reasons why the ARC might have started to listen to the Appalachian 
people. First, it makes sense to listen to Appalachians who know their region and know what 
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forms of development are needed. Secondly, the ARC had become somewhat detached from local 
issues. The following quote points at the latter issue: 
During FY 2000, ARC devoted much of its energy to building a consensus for an 
expanded program to help Appalachia’s remaining economically distressed 
counties become more competitive. In, addition, the Commission focused on 
identifying new partners to spur development of more homegrown businesses in 
Appalachia and engaged in a number of other collaborative efforts to benefit the 
region (ARC 2000, 5).  
 
This data extract was used because it best frames the ARC’s desire to find a new 
direction. Also, for an organization rebranding itself to foster increased community participation, 
the ARC made no mention of community contributions until 1995, which is ten years after the 
organization made the call for community involvement.  
The ARC community meetings are very small and limited for an organization trying to 
improve life for nearly 24 million people. An example of this is given in the following quote: 
“The Commission conducted community meetings from May through August in seven states. 
More than 750 people attended the meetings, including three Appalachian governors and the 
ARC federal co-chairman” (ARC 2000, 5). For an open public meeting, 750 people is a good 
draw but that number is weakened by the fact that the 750 participants were stretched over seven 
states. These open meetings seem to limit the ARC’s reach, and in response to this the ARC has 
also used an approach that focuses on key community members and leaders. For example, “the 
ARC identified 32 key issues facing the region and polled some 1,000 community leaders and 
citizens in five field forums on their significance” (ARC 2004, 8). This last approach is a better fit 
because it can reach more people and provide greater details to make decisions on new programs 
and projects.  
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  Along with increased community involvement, the ARC also started a strategic planning 
process in 1995. These strategic plans range from 5 to 6 years and are intended to be signposts in 
the path to development. In order to develop the first strategic plan;  
The ARC went into the region and listened to more than 2,000 Appalachians. 
Through four interstate town meetings, 13 focus-group discussions, nine 
consultations, and extensive research, they learned the region anew; the hopes, 
dreams, challenges, and opportunities the communities embrace (ARC 1995, 5). 
By learning the region anew the ARC is able to better understand the region’s needs and 
to make plans for the region’s future. However, the annual reports do not provide in-depth details 
on what the strategic plans will or might include. Also, it is unclear if these strategic plans take 
away some of the detail previously provided by the annual reports. Putting aside these issues, 
increasing the level of local input has only helped to strengthen the ARC.  
While community input has greatly strengthened the ARC, there are two issues not 
addressed in the annual reports, which should have been high-priority concerns for the people of 
Appalachia. These two issues are coal and roads. As issues that carry as much baggage as these 
two do, it is hard to believe that people did not talk about them. The ARC, in the annual reports, 
does talk about road construction projects but leaves out any comments by community leaders 
and members. This is strange because as an agency the ARC is trying to get the community 
involved. As noted in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the ARC’s discourse is inconsistent. In the annual 
reports the ARC is calling for community involvement but does not include abstracts, notes, or 
any documentation of what took place in these community meetings. Once again the ARC is 
unable to completely follow through on its discourse. The lack of findings is something that the 
ARC needs to address if it continues to claim full citizen participation. 
4.5 Economic Diversification 
 In the ARC’s efforts to diversify Appalachia’s economy, the ARC has employed 
“education programs tailored to the needs of expanding small business, tourism, the service 
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sector, or other industries” (ARC 1988, 7). The main area of ARC interest for economic 
development in the Appalachia is tourism and its supporting services (ARC 1991). Tourism is an 
extension of the service sector and the ARC states that, “service sector average wages are often 
considerably lower than those in the manufacturing and mining sectors” (ARC 2004, 26). Once 
the ARC concluded that the service jobs, such as retail, food service, and hospitably services, 
could not provide the same living standard as manufacturing and mining jobs, one would think 
that the ARC would reconsider its attention to tourism and its supporting services. Yet, due to the 
fact that service sector jobs are the easiest to bring in to a distressed region, the small economic 
boost is needed in the short term, but is not a long term fix to the economic problems of the 
region. In Appalachia much of the heavy industries such as, goods manufacturing, mining, 
textiles, and steel, have, and to a smaller scale still do, provide a high pay and full benefits.  
As the economic situation in Appalachia changes it becomes clearer that heavy industries 
will continue to decrease, and some industry will step in and take their place. What the ARC is 
not clear on is what industry will take the place of the heavy industries. As of right now the 
leading candidate is the lower end of the service sector (food service and big box retail chains). 
These service jobs should only be short-term fixes because they do not provide the same level of 
financial security that the heavy industry jobs and higher end service jobs (hospitals, law offices, 
and many others) do and in a region cursed with poverty and economic hardship that is a 
problem. 
 By the 2000s the ARC was reporting that “Appalachia’s traditional economic sectors 
were in decline and the ARC has worked to help the region develop the skills and infrastructure it 
needs to be economically competitive today and in the future” (ARC 2004, 6). The problem with 
this is that the “help” is in the form of increased tourism advertisement, “which includes a driving 
tours map, created in partnership with the National Geographic Society and a companion Web 
site” (ARC 2008, 5). By continuing to push growth in a sector that cannot support the same living 
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standard as heavy industry jobs, the ARC is providing growth but growth that only provides a 
stop-gap for poverty and economic distress.   
During this focus on tourism and an increased service sector, the coal industry once again 
bottomed out, but not in the same way as the 1950s and 1960s. This time, employment fell but 
production did not greatly diminish. The ARC addressed this in the 2004 and 2008 annual reports 
but these references are over 20 years after the bust. Also, these data extracts only state that the 
bust happened but offer no response to what it means for the region. The disregard of significant 
employment loss is unprecedented and makes one wonder what the ARC has been researching 
over the last 20 years.  
 Overall the ARC’s discourse between 1984 and 2008 is a mixed message. With the ARC 
no longer addressing coal and other energy investments, the ARC appears one-sided and out of 
touch. By not addressing coal in its discourse after 1984 the ARC falls in to the trap of allowing 
Appalachia to be viewed as a sacrifice zone. This is because in the ARC’s driving tours map of 
the region, the Central Appalachian coal region does not have many points of interest outside of 
reconditioned coal towns and mines. This new discourse allows for Central Appalachia to be set 
part from the other sub-regions. By doing this it appears that the ARC is using its discourse to 
detach the agency from coal. The ARC is detached from coal because it only uses reconditioned 
coal towns and mines to show the history of the region and not to inform the visitors on how coal 
and the coal industry impact the region today.     
 Economic diversification is the greatest hope for the region. However, the ARC still has a 
lot to learn and needs to rethink its push for tourism and a large service sector. One form of 
economic diversification that shows promise is the ARC’s push for locally-owned small business, 
increased agriculture, and craft goods. A few of these paths may fall under the service sector 
umbrella but since all are locally-owned a larger share of the profits stay in the region. Also, these 
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new business may offer better support for their employees than big box stores like Wal-Mart and 
Lowe’s. Moreover, these industries are not completely reliant on the outside world like tourism 
but provide the region with a competitive niche on the global market and make Appalachia 
attractive to a wealthier class of tourists. By increasing locally-owned and operated production 
the region can begin to better itself, a process that would fall in line with the ARC-redefined goals 
(ARC 2010). These new goals make self-sufficiency a part of the ARC’s discourse. This addition 
of self-sufficiency is not new, but a resurrection of part of the ARC’s discourse that was 
minimized in many of the annual reports from 1971 to 1984. I feel that this rearrangement of the 
ARC’s discourse allows the ARC greater flexibility and once and for all allows the region to 
make steps to break away from coal.   
4.6 Shifting Priorities  
 In my dataset I found two time periods that reflected different discourses in the ARC. 
Time period 1 included my first two themes and time period 2 included the last two. The main 
focus of the shift was the abandonment of discussion on coal. The shift took place in 1984 but 
may have been sooner taking into account all annual reports. The first question that needs to be 
asked is why the shift happened? Second, why did the focus on the environment and coal get 
minimized? By asking and answering these two questions I hope to explain why the ARC’s 
developmental focus changed.  
 The annual reports do not provide a clear reason for this shift but there are two 
possibilities that go hand in hand. These are the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the 
massive budget cuts he and his administration enacted in the first few years of his first term. As I 
mentioned above direct reference was not in the annual reports but a passing reference was made 
in the 1982 annual report, stating that a finish-up program had been initiated because funding for 
the ARC would be stopped after all capital projects had been completed. This disbandment of the 
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ARC did not happen, yet none of the annual reports state how or why the ARC was saved. 
However, the budget cuts severely crippled the ARC’s ability to fund projects and programs.  
 This is the point at which we see the ARC start to focus on mainly highway and some 
non-highway programs. No longer did the ARC spend time and money on past problems of the 
region because doing so would take up too much of its limited budget. By focusing on what the 
current administration felt was relevant, the ARC was able to keep its federal funding. By making 
these compromises the ARC was able to continue its mission to improve the lives of the people of 
Appalachia. However, these compromises came with a price. 
 The price of these compromises was the minimal attention given to the environment and 
most notably coal. Before 1984 most of the annual reports had a section entitled “Energy, 
Environment, and Natural Resources.” This section highlighted the past year’s projects and 
programs that focused on these three areas and how they were impacting the region. Although in 
many of the annual reports this section was brief, it was still present. This showed that the ARC 
was active in its mission to understand how energy, the environment, and natural resources have 
and will affect the region.  
Since 1984, I was only able to code 11 extracts that mentioned coal and the environment. 
Three extracts are repeated statements about the EPA’s brownfields clean-up program, another 
three are indirect statements about the downturn of the traditional Appalachian economy; three 
more are directly about the declining employment in the coal industry, and the last two discus 
alternative energy investments. In comparison between 1971 and 1984 I was able to code over 49 
extracts that dealt with coal and the environment either directly or indirectly.  
 After seeing the minimal coverage of coal and the environment since 1984, it is still 
unclear why this happened. The only reason that seems to fit is that the national energy crisis was 
over and investment in coal and environmental research was no longer necessary. Also, since coal 
48 
 
and environmental research was no longer a national priority the ARC had little choice but to cut 
them out because of the need to show the federal government that they were doing relevant 
research.  
 It appears that the shift in priorities at the ARC might have been involuntary. The shift 
could have been mandated by the Reagan administration and later carried on by George H.W. 
Bush and his administration. The silver-lining is that since 2000 the ARC annual reports have 
been providing more detail on research, programs and projects, on the same level as they did 
before 1984. Discussion about coal and environmental research has gained the least, but over time 
these areas should gain more interest, mainly because of the current energy crisis. The future of 
Appalachian coal is at the mercy of the national energy needs. Coal will be relevant as long as oil 
prices are high and alternative energy sources are still too small in number to supply large 
amounts of energy. This means that the coal industry in the ARC’s mind is not only vulnerable to 
a boom and bust economic cycle, but also a boom and bust research cycle.  
4.7 Conclusions  
 What is coal’s place in the ARC’s discourse of development and how has it changed over 
time? It would seem that coal is something that the ARC sees as important only when it is on the 
nation’s mind. Since 1971 the ARC has said that coal is not the only cause of poverty in the 
region but then shows that in Central Appalachia it is a major cause for the economic situation. 
This lack of attention to the sub-regional scale is what is missing in the ARC’s discourse, on how 
the ARC has handled coal and the coal industry prior to 1984. After 1984 coal and the coal 
industry are barely mentioned at all. It is one thing to talk about coal in a confusing manner but to 
not mention it at all is misleading. Although the ARC did show that coal does impact Central 
Appalachia, to suddenly not mention coal at all makes one wonder why.  
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In conclusion, it is clear that the ARC is subject to the current political administration and 
that some administrations limit the budgets of organization like the ARC. This political game is 
one factor that is driving the ARC position on coal; the other is energy needs. As mentioned 
earlier, coal is given a boost by the current energy needs but as soon as that increased need 
decreases, so does any interest in Appalachia.       
Overall the changes in priorities after 1984 were needed. The ARC has long attempted to 
develop Appalachia, but the people of the region have had little to no say in what was needed to 
be developed in the region. The increased community involvement was the best move the ARC 
could make but the ARC still managed to bumble it. Community involvement is great but when 
an issue like coal is nowhere to be found in the annual reports and no claim is made that the 
citizens were talking about needed improvements to control the coal industry is astonishing. This 
is despite the fact that there are numerous grassroots organizations such as the Kentuckians for 
the Commonwealth and Mountain Justice that are calling for community action against coal 
company control.  
Between 1971 and 2008 the ARC’s discourse changed. Until 1984 the ARC’s discourse 
focused on energy development and did so with a mix of Culture of Poverty and Internal 
Colonization language. After 1984, the ARC no longer used Culture of Poverty and Internal 
Colonization language but dropped its detailed discussion of coal and energy investment. With 
this in mind, the ARC is need of a review of its annual reports. By reviewing these reports, a 
understanding of the ARC’s past development plans is found and the ARC can make adjustments 
in order not to repeat the same mistakes.  
Geographically the ARC’s discourse continues to set Appalachia apart. For the most part, 
being set apart is just a way to bring interest to the region, such as using the terms Midwest, 
Northeast, or Southwest. However, there is a difference when one uses the term Appalachia. 
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Appalachia, unlike Midwest, Northeast, or Southwest, still carries with it a negative image. This 
image still involves isolation, poverty, and coal. Even after 47 years of the ARC this negative 
image of Appalachia is still present. By not dispelling the contemporary image of Appalachia, the 
ARCs discourse helps to enforce this image. 
Since coal does have a place, no matter how tentative, in the ARC’s discourse, the next 
step is to analyze coal’s place quantitatively. My last two research questions provide the 
framework for this analysis. By conducting this quantitative analysis I hope to provide a balance 
to the findings in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
COAL’S IMPACT ON APPALACHIAN KENTUCKY POVERTY AND MIGRATION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how coal interacts with poverty and migration. In 
the process of reaching this goal I answer my second and third research questions. Those 
questions are: 
Question 2: Can a measure of coal production provide the needed analytical power to explain the 
coal industry’s impact on Appalachian Kentucky? 
Question 3: Could the instability of the coal industry be a leading cause for poverty and migration 
in the region between 1980 and 2000?  
Answering these two questions provides a framework and a direction for my quantitative 
analysis. This chapter is broken into seven subsections. By setting up the chapter in this fashion I 
am able to build up to a regression analysis by showing the steps needed to be sure my datasets 
meet the requirements for regression. Once the regression analysis is completed, I then move to 
local statistics. Analyzing the local patterns provides a closer look at the spatial pattern of each 
variable. 
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In closing, this chapter summarizes the results found in the previous subsection and 
provides overall analysis of the results. This analysis addresses whether I was able to answer my 
two research questions and if further research is needed. Yet, before conclusions can be discussed 
I must take a closer look at the individual variables.          
5.2 Individual Variable Analysis  
 By examining the individual variables I am able to see if there is a spatial pattern to the 
variables. Yet, since I have three datasets this could become very complicated if I were to 
describe all the variables for dataset 1980, then 1990, and then 2000. Therefore, I have grouped 
the variables in a way that allows a reader to see the pattern of the variable and to see how that 
pattern changes between each decade. So, Poverty Rate 1980, 1990, and 2000 are analyzed 
together. To make this process a little more simplified, I have split the variables into dependent 
and independent classes. Doing this makes it clear that my dependent and independent variables 
are separate.  
The following figures in this section are classified using a manual equal interval method. 
This means that each class has the same interval. However, some of the variables have a class or 
two that are not at equal intervals. These variables include median age, net migration, percent of 
the population with a high school diploma or higher, and per capita income. The reason for these 
unequal intervals is that by 2000 the median age had increased to the point that the first two 
classes needed to be adjusted to keep the scale close to the scales for 1980 and 1990. For net 
migration, the ranges of positive and negative values are so extreme from dataset to dataset that a 
single equal interval scale is hard to create, but I have done by best to keep the classes equal. 
Next, the percent of the population with a high school diploma or higher increases so greatly from 
1980 to 2000, so that a few classes include only one value. This is done in order to preserve the 
equal intervals in the other classes. Lastly, the scale for per capita income in 2000 is slightly 
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different because the lowest income is no longer below $10,000. I adjusted the two classes to 
account for this.  
At the end of this subsection I compile my analysis and determine if the visual spatial 
patterns of the independent variables match the visual spatial patterns of the dependent variable 
(poverty). The goal of this subsection is to provide a base of inquiry. This base is the foundation 
on which a regression analysis can be built. Without knowing if there are interesting patterns in 
the data, doing a regression analysis is like stumbling for a light switch in the dark. By turning on 
the lights and comparing the spatial patterns, I can better predict if a regression analysis is 
necessary (Burt et al. 2009). 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Figure 2 below shows poverty rate by county in Appalachian Kentucky for the 1980 
dataset. This map shows that the highest rates of poverty are in the center of the study area. There 
are also a few higher poverty counties on the Kentucky-Tennessee border. The counties with 
lower poverty rates are along the West Virginia and Virginia border, as well as long the west 
central border (these are the counties closest to Lexington, KY). In this figure and all of the other 
individual variable figures, when I refer to higher rates, this means the top two classes, and when 
I refer to lower rate, its means the lower to classes. 
Why do we see this pattern? First, Appalachian Kentucky can be broken into three parts. 
The easternmost part is the coal region, the westernmost part is an agricultural/urban region, and 
the center is a heavily forested region (Edwards et al. 2006). According to Figure 2, the coal and 
agricultural industries provide better opportunities than the forest industry, in 1980.  
Figure 3 shows poverty rate by county in Appalachian Kentucky for the 1990 dataset. In 
1990 there are more counties in the two high poverty classes than Figure 2. Figure 3 shows that 
the highest rates of poverty are in the center of the study area. Also the poverty rates for the 
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southeastern and eastern parts of the study area have increased. This leaves the western part of the 
study area with the lowest poverty rates.   
The economic modes addressed for Poverty Rates in 1980 still hold in 1990. However, 
poverty rates have increased region wide. Figure 3 suggests that between 1980 and 1990 the 
economy in Appalachian Kentucky contracted allowing for poverty rates to increase. This figure 
shows that a regression to analyze a cause for this increased poverty is needed.  
Figure 4 below shows poverty rate by county in Appalachian Kentucky for the 2000 
dataset. This figure visually suggests that poverty in Appalachian Kentucky has decreased. 
However, for many of the counties the poverty rate is still above 20 percent. This map shows that 
the highest rates of poverty are still in the center of the study area. Overall, the poverty situation 
in Appalachian Kentucky did improve from 1990 to 2000.  
In looking at Figures 2-4 an overall pattern starts to emerge. This pattern shows a gradual 
northern and eastward progression of high poverty rates. This progression may be a direct result 
of the coal industry bust in the mid-1980s (ARC 2010). However, this assumption is indirect and 
is open to debate. By analyzing the independent variables I hope to find support for this 
assumption.   
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5.2.2 Independent Variables 
The pattern shown in Figure 5 depicting per capita coal production is not surprising. This 
is because in Appalachian Kentucky the coal is mainly in the eastern and southeastern part of the 
state. However, the Eastern Kentucky coal seams do extend into the center and northeastern part 
of the state. What is surprising is the fact that counties with high poverty rates also have a high 
rate of coal production. This find is one step in linking coal production to poverty. 
Figure 6, showing 1990 per capita coal production, does not visually differ much from 
Figure 5. The difference is in the coal rate. All across Appalachian Kentucky, coal production has 
decreased but the counties with the highest rates are still the same as in 1980, except one. The 
exception is Breathitt County, Kentucky, this county fell to under 200 tons of coal per person in 
2000.  
Similarly, there is little visual difference between Figures 5-7. Figure 7 does show that a 
few counties moved to the middle category and one county in the middle category increased 
production enough to move to the next higher class. The real difference between Figures 5-7 is 
the decrease in coal production, between 1980 and 1990. By 2000, only a few counties are above 
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the middle class. This visually shows that production over the 30 years of this study has tapered 
off.  
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Figures 8-10 show the decadal average of the coal severance tax taken from the coal 
industry and given to the counties as compensation for lost economic potential. Later in this 
chapter a decision will be made whether to keep both variables or to use only one of them. One 
problem with Figures 8-10, is the scale. The range for these figures had to be stretched to 
$125,000,000 because of an outlier (Pike County). Yet, Pike County does show a direct impact of 
decreased coal production. This is because the coal severance tax receipts for Pike in 1980 were 
around $125,000,000 but by 2000 were cut to around $41,000,000. This drop in economic 
compensation may have an impact on poverty. Later in this chapter I discuss if there is indeed a 
relationship between poverty and the coal severance tax. 
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 Figure 11 shows that the highest median age in Appalachian Kentucky is in the 
southwestern part of the region. High values also extend up the western edge of the region. The 
rest of the region fits into the first three classes, with the lowest median age being concentrated in 
the easternmost part of the region.  
Figure 12 shows that the highest median age is in the southwestern part of the region. 
High values also extend up the western edge of the region and east long the Ohio River. The rest 
of the region fits into the middle category. In Figure 12 there is only one county (Rowan) in the 
lowest class. This can be explained because Morehead State University is in Rowan County. 
In 2000 nearly all of the counties in the study area are in the top two classes. The 
remaining four counties contain either a university or some other higher educational institution 
lowering the median age.  
 Overall from 1980 to 2000 there has been an increase in median age for Appalachian 
Kentucky. The reasons for this are not directly clear but can be narrowed to a few possibilities. 
The first possible answer involves natural aging without a high birth rate. The second possible 
answer involves natural aging with a high out-migration of the younger population. The third 
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possibility involves natural aging with an in-migration of an older population and a high out-
migration of the younger population. The lastly all these possibilities involve an age gap. Before 
1980 there was a high in-migration of young workers but after the bust of the coal industry in the 
mid-1980s they departed, leaving an age gap in the population. All four of these answers are 
plausible but none were tested. They were not tested because to answer for increasing median age 
does not directly fit with the goal of this thesis. However, future investigation in this area is 
required. This is because the ARC has also discovered this problem and found that it is 
hampering its efforts to diversify the Appalachian economy (ARC 2004). The ARC believes that 
with an aging population in Appalachian Kentucky new businesses are unable or unwilling move 
to the region because the current population would not support the workforce need for the new 
businesses and would not provide the proper consumer base (ARC 2004).  
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 Figure 14 shows that nearly all of Appalachian Kentucky experienced positive net 
migration in 1980. The highest gains came in the north central part of the region, along the 
Virginia/Tennessee border and in the westernmost county in the study area. The lowest increases 
are seen in the western part of the region. Also, these positive net migration rates provide some 
support as to why the median age in 1980 was low in eastern Kentucky. This is because as the 
coal industry was booming it drew in younger workers, thus lowering the median age of the 
region. 
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Figure 15 shows that people in Appalachian Kentucky are migrating out of the coal 
region (the easternmost counties in the study area). These net migration rates seem to follow the 
pattern of the bust in the coal industry. 
Figure 16 shows a similar pattern to Figure 15. This means that there was a negative net 
migration and it took place in the eastern part of the region. After one decades of net migration 
increase, counties in the eastern part of the region lost as much as 14-17 percent of their 
populations, in the following to decades.  
 The pattern shown in Figures 14-16 closely mirrors the pattern seen in Figures 2-4. This 
shows that a thriving economy attracts new residents but as soon as the region loses some of its 
economic stability people leave. This process seems to lag behind the poverty rate because the 
coal boom and the need for workers ended in the mid-1980s (ARC 2010) but the positive net 
migration did not end until 2000. 
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Since the pattern in Figures 17-19, depicting education rates, is very similar I will discuss 
the figures together. In all three maps there is a circular pattern. The center of this ring has the 
lowest education percentage. The reason for this is explained in the analysis of per capita income 
shown in, Figures 20-22. The greatest difference between these three maps is the dramatic 
increase in education levels. In 1990 the lowest class and in 2000 the lowest two classes had to be 
adjusted because the education level had increased above 36 percent in 1990 and in 2000 the 
lowest class is 49 percent. This shows that Appalachian Kentucky has made great advances in 
65 
 
educational attainment but the central part of the region is still lagging behind. The central part of 
the region did also see an increase in education level but the level is still not as high as the rest of 
the region. However, one explanation is that the education level in this area was very low to begin 
with. Also, this area according to Figures 17-19 did experience the greatest increases in 
educational attainment.   
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 The pattern in Figure 20, showing per capita income, is similar to that of the pattern 
found in Figures 17-19. This shows that education attainment is related to income. This is 
because the counties with low per capita income (PCI) experience low education levels. 
However, in Figure 21 the ring of higher PCIs starts to diminish and higher PCI values start to 
move west. 
Figure 22 shows that in 2000 the highest PCIs follow a diagonal pattern from the 
southwestern edge of the region to the Ohio River. Also the ring of high PCIs is nearly gone, 
leaving most of the eastern part of the region with the lowest PCIs. 
 Overall PCIs did increase between 1980 and 2000 but the pattern changed. The pattern 
showed a westward trend, the opposite of the poverty rate, shown in Figures 2-4. This pattern 
suggests that there is instability in some of Appalachian Kentucky’s local economies, most 
notably those associated with the coal industry. Also, it seems that PCI and education are closely 
related. Whether I use both variables or just one of these variables is detailed in section 5.3. 
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In Figure 23 the highest unemployment rates are in the north central part of the region. 
The lowest unemployment is found on the northwestern edge of the region, near Lexington. 
Figure 24 shows that in 1990 unemployment decreases in the region, but the pattern moves east 
and expands to cover nearly all of the eastern part of Appalachian Kentucky. The pattern in 
Figure 25 is very different that the pattern in Figures 23 and 24. This is because unemployment 
has dropped to less than 12 percent and only a few pockets of counties are around 12 percent.  
It is clear from Figures 23-25 that unemployment rate decreased each decade and the 
pattern changed as well. However, this shows that employment is still concentrated in a few parts 
of the region. This is made clear when unemployment rates moved east in 1990 and then returned 
to the center in 2000. It is clear because employment in the east is dominated by the coal industry 
and in 1990s the coal industry was still weak from the economic bust in the mid-1980s and could 
not employ as many people as it had in the past. However, by 2000 it appears that the coal 
industry’s ability to employ workers had improved.  
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5.2.3 Individual Variable Analysis Results 
 Overall, the patterns found in this individual variable analysis show that there is a case 
for further analysis. As noted earlier, Figures 2-4 show an eastward trend of increasing poverty 
rates. By themselves these figures do not explain much, but paired with three other variables that 
show the opposite pattern, an interesting pattern emerges. The three variables are Median Age, 
Net Migration, and PCI. Out of these variables PCI seems to be the strongest. Later in the chapter 
an Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) and the OLS Regression provide more answers as to why 
there is a relationship between poverty and these three variables. Until then these three variables 
are the most likely to be the best predictors of poverty in Appalachian Kentucky for my three 
datasets.  
5.3 Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) 
 An EDA allows me to provide evidence that my dataset can be analyzed in an OLS 
regression. An EDA provides the need information to address the four following regression 
assumptions.  
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1. The regression must fit the data. 
2. No multicollinearity exists between variables.  
3. There must be homogeneity of variance. 
4. The error terms must be randomly distributed.  
Appendix A.3 includes the figures I used to conclude that my dataset did meet all four 
regression assumptions. However, assumption 4 is assessed in section five of this chapter.  
 The rest of this subsection is broken up in to three parts. The parts are 1980, 1990, and 
2000. These subsections cover an abbreviated EDA. The EDA may be abbreviated but all 
required parts are covered.  
5.3.1 1980 
The Pearson’s Correlation in Table 1 shows the relationship between the variables. It not 
only shows the relation between poverty rate and the seven independent variables but the 
relationship between all variables. First, I look at the relationship between poverty rate and the 
independent variables. Table 1 shows that three independent variables strongly relate to poverty 
rate. These variables are percent high school degree or higher, PCI, and unemployment. Both the 
Pearson’s r for percent high school degree or higher and PCI is negative, meaning that as they 
increase poverty rates decrease. For unemployment, the Pearson’s r is positive, meaning that as 
unemployment increases poverty rates also increase. 
 However, there is a problem. In looking at the other relationships I found that four 
independent variables have a strong relationship between one other independent variable. These 
relationships are percent high school degree or higher with PCI and tons of coal per person in 
poverty with coal tax. In order to meet assumption 2, I must cut one of each of the variables. I 
chose to cut percent high school degree or higher because the Pearson’s r was lower than PCI’s 
and PCI’s pattern in Figures 20-22 is closer to the pattern of poverty. As for tons of coal per 
person in poverty and coal tax, the task of cutting one is much harder. In the end I chose to cut 
tons of coal per person in poverty. This is because the variables are very close and the coal tax 
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data seems to be more reliable. The coal tax data is more reliable because it is a single measure of 
coal production and is not directly tied to another variable. 
Table 1: Pearson’s Correlation 1980 
Pearson’s Correlation Table                                                                                  Dataset 1980 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  8. 
1. PovRate80 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. PctHSorhigher80 -0.829** 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3.TonsPerPerson80 0.104 -0.144 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
4. AjCoalTax80 -0.047 -0.064 0.890** 1 -- -- -- -- 
5. AjPerCapIn80 -0.890** 0.866** -0.018 0.103 1 -- -- -- 
6. MedAge80 -0.137 0.034 -0.501** -0.391** 0.065 1 -- -- 
7. AvgUnEmployRate80 0.302 -0.421** 0.256 0.197 -0.374** -0.287* 1 -- 
8. NetMigRate80 -0.109 0.022 0.126 0.121 0.088 -0.283 0.088 1 
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)                         * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
5.3.2 1990  
The Pearson’s Correlation in Table 2 shows that six independent variables strongly relate 
to poverty rate. All the variables but coal tax have a significant relationship with poverty. All the 
variables but tons of coal per person in poverty and unemployment have a negative relationship 
with poverty rate.  
In looking at the relationships between the independent variables, the same four 
independent variables as in the 1980 dataset have a strong relationship. I have chosen to treat the 
1990 dataset the same way I as treated the 1980 dataset and cut tons of coal per person in poverty 
and percent high school diploma or higher. 
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Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation 1990 
Pearson’s Correlation Table                                                                                  Dataset 1990 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  8. 
1. PovRate90 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. PctHSorhigher90 -0.797** 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3.TonsPerPerson90 0.271* -0.183 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
4. AjCoalTax90 -0.119 -0.078 0.878** 1 -- -- -- -- 
5. AjPerCapIn90 -0.890** 0.880** -0.246 -0.119 1 -- -- -- 
6. MedAge90 -0.431** 0.128 -0.359** -0.256 0.371** 1 -- -- 
7. AvgUnEmployRate90 0.415** -0.380** 0.240 0.203 -0.416** -0.253 1 -- 
8. NetMigRate90 -0.394** 0.304* 0.501** -0.467** 0.274* 0.209 -0.406** 1 
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)                            * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
5.3.3 2000 
 The Pearson’s Correlation in Table 3 shows that five independent variables strongly 
relate to poverty rate. All the variables but coal tax and median age have a significant relationship 
with poverty. Three variables have a positive relationship with poverty and four have a negative 
relationship. In looking at the relationships between the independent variables, the same four 
independent variables as in the 1980 dataset and the 1990 dataset have a strong relationship. I 
have chosen to treat the 2000 dataset the same way the other two datasets and cut tons of coal per 
person in poverty and percent high school diploma or higher. 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation 2000 
Pearson’s Correlation Table                                                                                     Dataset 2000 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  8. 
1. PovRate00 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
2. PctHSorhigher00 -0.816** 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3.TonsPerPerson00 0.259 -0.149 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
4. AjCoalTax00 0.159 -0.067 0.879** 1 -- -- -- -- 
5. AjPerCapIn00 -0.890** 0.864** -0.283* -0.165 1 -- -- -- 
6. MedAge00 -0.208 -0.003 -0.460** -0.005 -0.169 1 -- -- 
7. AvgUnEmployRate00 0.670** -0.667** 0.162 0.081 -0.704** -0.147 1 -- 
8. NetMigRate00 -0.412** 0.218 -0.605** -0.547** 0.350** -0.069 -0.291* 1 
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)                            * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
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5.3.4 EDA Results 
 By conducting an EDA I have found that my datasets are ready for regression analysis. In 
doing the EDA the hardest part was cutting variables, especially cutting the variable tons of coal 
per person in poverty. However, this was done in order to be consistent and keep the datasets the 
same. By keeping my datasets the same I am able to make comparisons between the results of 
each OLS regression.     
5.4 Regression Analysis 
 As stated in 3.3.1, I use an OLS regression to analyze the relationship between poverty, 
migration, and coal. The two most common methods are Enter, where all variables are included in 
the model, and Stepwise, where the most significant variables are included. I use the Stepwise 
method because it provides the same significant variables as the Enter method and eliminates 
variables that do not have a significant influence on poverty. 
5.4.1 Stepwise Regression Results 
 Table 4 below displays the regression results for the 1980 data set. Overall, the regression 
is very strong in 1980 with an R2 of 0.792. This shows that in 1980 the relationship between 
poverty and the independent variables is well predicted. However, the Stepwise method only 
showed PCI to be significant. It is surprising that with only one variable in the model the R2 was 
still above 0.75. Since, the other independent variables are not significant, additional independent 
variables need to be added, if this project leads to future research.    
Table 5 below displays the regression results for the 1990 data set. Overall, the regression 
is very strong in 1990 with an R2 of 0.817. Table 5 also shows that in the 1990 dataset two 
variables are significant. These variables are PCI and Net Migration. With the addition of Net 
Migration the regression for the 1990 dataset does predict the relationship with poverty better 
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than the regression for the 1980 dataset. Yet, in the 1990 dataset PCI is still the greatest 
contributor to the high R2 value.  
 Table 6 below displays the regression results for the 2000 data set. Overall, the regression 
is very strong in 2000 with an R2 of .793. The R2 value for the 2000 dataset is on par with the R2 
of the 1980 dataset because once again PCI is the only significant variable. This result shows that 
PCI is the most constant predictor of poverty in Appalachian Kentucky for the 2000 dataset. 
Table 4: Stepwise Regression 1980 
Stepwise Regression 1980 
R2 0.792 Regression Model 1 Sig. VIF 
Adjusted R2 0.788 AjPerCapIn80 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 5: Stepwise Regression 1990 
Stepwise Regression 1990 
R2 0.817 Regression Model 1 Sig. VIF 
Adjusted R2 0.810 AjPerCapIn90 0.000 1.000 
 Regression Model 2 Sig. VIF 
AjPerCapIn90 0.000 1.081 
NetMigRate90 0.012 1.081 
 
Table 6: Stepwise Regression 2000 
Stepwise Regression 2000 
R2 0.793 Regression Model 1 Sig. VIF 
Adjusted R2 0.789 AjPerCapIn00 0.000 1.000 
 
5.4.2 Regression Results 
 Section 5.4.1 demonstrates that all three regression models are able to provide a strong 
relationship between poverty and one or two independent variables. It is clear that PCI is has the 
strongest relationship and this should have been expected because poverty rate are based on 
income. It is surprising that the coal tax variable was not significant. However, the reason for this 
could be explained by the fact that not every county in Appalachian Kentucky produces coal and 
therefore does not receive money from the coal severance tax.  
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 These regressions do provide a base for future research. This is because so much of the 
economy in Appalachian Kentucky is based on extractive industries such as coal; PCI can be seen 
as an indirect coal variable (Roenker 2001). The results would have been stronger if the coal tax 
variable was significant. 
During the course of this regression I found that the results are slightly misleading. This 
because the most significant variable is PCI and income is used in the calculation of poverty. This 
inherent relationship seems to have inflated my R2 values. Yet, when PCI is cut the R2 drops 
below 0.20 and become insignificant in the eyes of most social scientists (Burt et al. 2009). I have 
kept PCI in to show the results that I have found, but to answer whether or not a coal variable 
provides and answer for the poverty in Appalachian Kentucky, I would have to say no.  
5.5 Residual Analysis 
 In this subsection I discuss the residuals from each regression. By analyzing the 
regression pattern I am able to see if the regressions fit the data provided. Also by mapping the 
residuals I am able address spatial autocorrelation in my models. Autocorrelation is of interest in 
this study because if my models prove to have autocorrelation then the models could be biased 
and therefore devoid of any analytical value.  
According to Figure 26 the regression model for the 1980 dataset fits best in the 
southwestern part of my study area. This is because the closer the residuals are to zero the better 
the fit. So in the southwestern part of the study area there is a cluster of the middle category. As 
for autocorrelation, the residuals visually appear to be random. The pattern is random because 
there is mix of values. The pattern is random but it does seem to lean to positive autocorrelation 
because of the cluster of positive values in the south. Yet, I feel that this model is unbiased and is 
analytically viable.  
77 
 
According to Figure 27 the regression model for the 1990 dataset fits best in the south 
central part of my study area. As for autocorrelation, this model shows slight positive 
autocorrelation. However, I feel that this slight positive autocorrelation does not bias this model 
because there is still a mix of values in the center of the study area. 
The pattern in Figure 28 does not have as much positive autocorrelation as Figure 27 but 
it is still present on a very small scale. Nevertheless, Figure 28 does show that this model best fits 
eastern part of the study area.    
5.5.1 Regression Residual Results 
  Overall Figures 26-28 do not show a consistent fit. Rather, they show a moving pattern. 
Through the three decades the area that best fits the regression model moves east. This is 
important because this means that something in my 1990 and 2000 dataset is pulling that pattern 
east. It is hard to determine the direct cause but by 2000 the best fit area is close to the coal region 
in Appalachian Kentucky. This may mean that coal is having an unseen impact on the other 
variables in this analysis.  
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5.6 Local Statistics  
 By analyzing local statistics I am able to see autocorrelation in more detail. The local 
statistic employed in this section is Anselin’s Local Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA). 
LISA “is a local value of the global Moran’s I statistic” (Burt et al. 2009, 560). By finding local 
clusters of variables I am able to judge if my regressions are influenced by these clusters. 
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5.6.1 Dependent Variable 
In Figure 29 there is a cluster of High-High (HH) in the center of the region and one 
county in the HH class in the south. Also there are a few Low-Low (LL) counties on the Ohio 
River and on the western border. The LL counties are counties with large suburban populations or 
contain a large city. As for the HH counties, they are rural counties in the most forested part of 
the state. Figure 29 show that urban areas in Appalachian Kentucky are not as poor as rural areas. 
Figure 30 shows nearly the same pattern as Figure 29. However, there are a few 
differences. There is one less LL county on the Ohio River and two LL counties were added on 
the western border. The biggest difference is in the number of HH counties. The HH counties 
now follow the Daniel Boone National Forest. One thing is still clear: the urban/rural pattern is 
still in play. 
Figure 31 shows that by 2000 there are a few more LL counties in the west and the center 
of the region has stabilized, because there are fewer HH counties. Overall the pattern is still the 
same as Figures 29 and 30. 
 The clustering patterns shown in Figures 29-31 indicate that poverty around the 
major cities of Appalachian Kentucky tend to cluster with low rates. As for the HH counties, the 
swing in the number of counties in the cluster could be caused by the instability in the local 
economy. This means as the poverty rate increases or decreases in a county, that county may no 
longer be similar to its surrounding counties and therefore no longer included in the cluster. 
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5.6.2 Independent Variables 
 The following figures have nearly the same pattern and are discussed together. Figures 
32-34 show a HH cluster in the southeastern part of the study area. These counties are the largest 
producers of coal in Appalachian Kentucky and this area has relatively high poverty rates. 
Between the three figures there is one difference. Figures 32 and 33 lose two counties and it is not 
clear why. It could be that the ratio of tons of coal per person in poverty changed enough to make 
these two counties not significant.  
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 Below, Figures 35-37 have the nearly the same pattern not only as each other but also as 
Figures 32-34. Also, the explanation for the patterns in Figures 35-37 is dependent on coal 
production. If coal production slows, the amount of tax received decreases, thus making a county 
significant or not. Also the closeness of the patterns in Figures 32 through 37 makes it clear that 
these variables are closely related.   
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Below, Figure 38 shows a HH cluster in the southwestern part of the study area. This 
cluster reinforces what was found in Figure 11. This is because the southwestern part of the study 
area has the highest median ages. The same pattern holds for Figure 39, because Figure 12 also 
shows that western part of the study area has the highest median ages. Also the LL cluster in 
Figure 38 is the area of lowest median age in Figure 11. The LL cluster does not show up in 
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Figures 39 and 40 because the median age of Figures 12 and 13 greatly increases between 1980 
and 2000. However, Figure 38 does have one county (Madison) with a LH value. This means that 
Madison County displays negative autocorrelation. However, this is explained by the presence of 
Eastern Kentucky University in Madison County. However, the LH value does not carry over to 
Figures 39 and 40. The most interesting part about Figures 38-40 is that by 2000, only one county 
is in the HH class. This is interesting because it would appear that the region is becoming more 
homogeneous in its median age range and that median age is high.     
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Below, Figure 41 shows that there is HH positive spatial autocorrelation in the study area 
along the West Virginia border and in the south. This HH cluster is accurate because it includes 
an area of high net migration as shown in Figure 14. Figure 42 shows a LL cluster along the West 
Virginia and Virginia border, and Figure 15 shows that area to have the lowest net migration 
rates. Figure 43 shows that nearly all of the eastern part of the study area lost population and 
Figure 16 shows the lowest net migration rates in that area as well. Overall Figures 41-43 are 
similar to Figures 14-16. 
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In Figure 44 below there is HH clustering along the Ohio River and along the west 
central border. This positive spatial autocorrelation of education is a result of the proximity to 
large urban and suburban areas. This is because in these areas there is a greater access to 
education. There is a LL cluster of positive spatial autocorrelation in the center of the study area. 
This single county is Owsley County and it stands out because in my 1980 dataset Owsley 
County had the lowest education level in the study area. Figure 44 also shows a cluster of High-
Low (HL), which is negative spatial autocorrelation. The only county in this cluster is Rowan 
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County. The presence of negative spatial autocorrelation is not unexpected because Rowan 
County is the home of a moderate size university (Morehead State University). 
The HH pattern in Figure 45 is identical to the HH pattern in Figure 44 and the reasons 
for these patterns are the same. Figure 45 differs by showing an increased LL cluster. This could 
mean that the LL area is experiencing harder economic times. 
Figure 46 shows that by 2000 the HH cluster on the west central border grew by one 
county. This could be because that area is experiencing economic growth and that growth is 
opening doors for greater education. Also the HH cluster along the Ohio River is unchanged since 
Figure 44. In Figure 46 the LL cluster changed a little but is still centered on Owsley County. 
Overall, Figures 44-46 show that higher education levels are associated with urban and 
suburban areas. One thing that is interesting is that the HL cluster in Figure 44 does not hold in 
the other figures. This could mean that enrollment at Morehead State has decreased or that the 
university is raising the education level of the region, making Rowan County insignificant. 
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 Below are Figures 47- 49. These figures show the local pattern of PCI and that pattern 
mirrors the pattern seen in Figures 44- 46. The main difference is in Figure 49. Figure 49 is 
different because the HH cluster on the west central border near Lexington has grown. Also the 
LL cluster no longer contains Owsley County. This is strange because Owsley County is still in 
the LL education cluster in Figure 46 but Owsley County in 2000 was no longer the lowest 
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income county. It had moved up to 45th place out of 55. In all, the similar patterns in Figures 44 
through 49 show that education and PCI go hand and hand.     
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 Out of all the previous figures, Figures 50- 52 have the greatest variation of spatial 
autocorrelation. This is because when there is a pocket of significant negative spatial 
autocorrelation, it is surrounded by the corresponding significant positive spatial autocorrelation. 
This can be seen in Figures 50 and 51. In Figure 50 Rowan County is a pocket of LH, meaning 
that Rowan County has low unemployment and the surrounding area has high unemployment. 
This is reinforced when the main cluster of HH in Figure 50 is right below the LH cluster. This 
could mean that Rowan County and mainly Morehead State University are drawing their workers 
from these counties. The LL cluster is harder to determine. The only conclusion is that these 
counties are closer to areas with an employment need.  
Figure 51 shows nearly the same pattern as Figure 50 but has added a new negative 
spatial autocorrelation cluster. This negative spatial autocorrelation cluster is an HL cluster and is 
right above the Low-High (LH) cluster. The reasons for this HL cluster could be the result of 
people traveling out of the county for employment, or because the major source of employment in 
this county (Lewis) has closed, or a combination of both. In Figure 51 the LH cluster is the same 
but the HH cluster has shifted. Also, the LL cluster has moved to center around the western 
border. 
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In Figure 52 the HH cluster moves back south of the LH cluster, all while the LH cluster 
stays in Rowan County. Other than the shifting HH cluster and the diminished LL cluster, Figure 
51 is nearly the same as Figures 50 and 52; also the reasons for the patterns stay the same.  
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5.6.3 Local Statistics Results  
 Overall the LISA analysis has provided two points of interest. First, LISA made it 
possible to see that the PCI variable and percent high school diploma or higher variable have 
nearly the same pattern. Also LISA shows that the coal tax variable and the tons of coal per 
person in poverty variable have a similar pattern as well. This allows me to have greater 
confidence in my decision to cut both the percent high school diploma or higher variable and the 
tons of coal per person in poverty variable from the regression. The second point of interest is that 
outside of the directly coal-related variables, the coal region of Eastern Kentucky did not stand 
out in any HH or LL cluster. This could be because there is not enough difference in the other 
variables for significant HH or LL clusters to appear. An answer to this question at this point is 
out of the reach of this thesis.  
 Outside of what is discussed above, LISA allows me to see that there are very few local 
patterns of interest. This also enforces the minimal findings in both the independent variable 
analysis and the OLS regression. This is not to say that what was found is not important, it just 
means that these findings are not as strong as the findings in the thematic discourse analysis.   
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5.7 Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter was to answer the following two questions: can a measure of coal 
production provide the needed analytical power to explain the coal industry’s impact on 
Appalachian Kentucky and could the instability of the coal industry be a leading cause for 
poverty and migration out of the region between 1980 and 2000? In the next paragraphs I will 
discuss each of my questions in detail, and whether my analysis provides enough information to 
answer them.  
 The answer to the first question about the analytical power of would have to be no. This 
is because neither of the coal-related variables (coal tax or tons of coal per person in poverty) was 
found to have a significant relationship with poverty in the OLS regression. If the relationship 
with poverty was solely a measure of coal production then the regression analysis would have 
shown that. This was not the case. Tables 4-6 show that the variable with the strongest 
relationship with poverty was PCI. This is not a complete failure because in Appalachian 
Kentucky, especially in the southeastern part, the coal industry is a leading employer (Roenker 
2001). Saying that this is not a complete failure does not entirely mean it was a complete success 
either. This is because of the inherent relationship between poverty and PCI. No matter the 
situation, very low income levels have the possibility to lead to higher levels of poverty. It is true 
that Appalachian Kentucky’s population is heavily dependent on the coal industry for their 
income, but the link is weak in this study and further research in needed to fully realize this link. 
 However, this study is able to show clear evidence of the boom and bust cycle that 
plagues the coal industry of Appalachian Kentucky. This cycle is seen when comparing Figures 
2-4 with Figures 20- 22. Figures 2- 4 show high poverty rates moving east between 1980 and 
2000, then Figures 20- 22 show higher PCI’s moving west in the same time period. This 
illustration of the boom and bust cycle directly provides part of the answer to my third question.  
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It would appear that the instability of the coal industry is a leading cause for poverty and 
migration in the region between 1980 and 2000. As stated above, poverty increases as PCI 
decreases. Also, the migration half of question three is also met. This part of the question was not 
directly answered in my regression but can be seen visually in section 5.2.2. The net migration 
figures are Figures 14, 15, and 16. These figures show that as you move from decade to decade, 
positive net migration deceases and negative net migration increases. This visually aligns with the 
increases in poverty rates, decreases in PCI’s, and decreases in both coal-related variables. This 
means that coal and the coal industry has the ability to bring people to the region when they have 
a need for employees, but when the situation reverses those new people do not have any strong 
ties to the region and move to areas that meet their needs. I am not saying that this pattern is 
unique to Appalachian Kentucky but this region’s migrations patterns are slightly different than 
the patterns seen in other parts of the United States. It is different because of booms and bust 
cycles. Even when agencies such as the ARC attempt to stabilize the region the boom and bust 
cycle still prevails, although the intensity of the effect may be dulled, meaning that other sectors 
of the Appalachian economy (services and agriculture) are fostered by the ARC and these sectors 
provide a little relief.    
Also, since the boom and bust cycle is still evident in this quantitative analysis this raises 
a new question. This question is how are ARC policies combating the cycle of boom and bust? It 
is true that a direct measure of coal production did not help to explain the coal industry’s impact 
on the region, but I feel that this analysis still provides enough analytical power to make a 
decision on the coal industry’s impact. I have to say the coal industry does impact the region and 
the boom and bust cycle is its main weapon. In the end, if Appalachian Kentucky cannot break 
the boom and bust cycle the future looks bleak.  
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Chapter VI 
 
 
HOW FAR HAVE WE COME? HOW MUCH FURTHER DO WE HAVE TO GO? 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 Throughout this thesis I have addressed three questions. These questions are: 
Question 1: What is coal’s place in the ARC’s discourse of development and how has it changed 
over time?  
Question 2: Can a measure of coal production provide the needed analytical power to explain the 
coal industry’s impact on Appalachian Kentucky? 
Question 3: Could the instability of the coal industry be a leading cause for poverty and migration 
out of the region between 1980 and 2000?  
First, this chapter highlights the limitations in this study, next, I provide a recap of the qualitative 
and quantitative results, and lastly, I conclude with the relevance of this work.  
6.2 Limitations of this Study 
This thesis does have a few limitations. First, question 1 has a different timeframe and 
study area than questions 2 and 3. This difference is not detrimental to my argument but allows  
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me to show the breath of the ARC and then to focus on a time period of change in the region. 
Second, due to the time needed for data collection and analysis, the scope of this project and 
specifically questions 2 and 3 is limited to Appalachian Kentucky. Also, the years covered are 
1980, 1990, and 2000. The project is limited to Appalachian Kentucky due to the large number of 
distressed counties (ARC 2010) and because of the large number of coal-producing counties. I 
cover the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 for two reasons. First, the census years 1980, 1990, and 
2000 are the most readily available. Secondly, the ARC has provided data from these three census 
years. The next limitation is that of the coal data. The coal data used covers the years 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 but is limited to percent surface mined coal and percent underground mined coal per 
county. Since the available data are at the county level, this project was conducted at the county 
level. It would be nice to see the interaction of coal and poverty at a smaller geographic scope but 
it is unfeasible with the available data.  
 In looking at the interaction of coal with poverty this project is not directly stating why 
poverty exists, just that coal may help explain why it exists in a given county. This means that I 
am not giving a theoretical reason of why there is poverty; just that poverty and coal are closely 
linked. Also, question 1 helps in showing where the ARC incorporates coal into its development 
discourse and provides a basis to make changes if needed.  The final limitation of this project is 
that of the quantitative analysis. I have chosen to limit my analysis to ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS). This is done because I have the most experience with this analysis tool and it 
provides reliable and easily interpreted results. 
6.3 Coal’s Place in the ARC’s Discourse of Development  
 In the process of answering this question, I found four themes that allowed for my 
analysis. These four themes as mentioned in section 4.1 are: (1) isolation and the road network 
have set the region apart; (2) energy investment brings coal center-stage but coal is not the only 
cause of Appalachia’s economic fluctuation; (3) community involvement; (4) economic 
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diversification. In my analysis, I also discovered a shift in the priorities of the ARC. The shift 
happened around 1984. The shift meant that the first two themes were most pertinent to time 
period 1 and the last two represent time period 2.  
 As revealed by the first two themes, the ARC discourse is focused on what happened in 
Appalachia’s past and how it could be corrected. One problem is that the ARC uses both cultural 
determinism and environmental determinism to explain Appalachia. This seems counter-
productive because cultural determinism was created to refute environmental determinism and 
one would think the two theories could not be used to explain one region. Curiously, both theories 
were part of the ARC discourse. The theme that isolation and the road network have set the 
region apart opens the door for the theme of energy investment. This is because the ARC 
discourse allows reader to believe that any and all types of development benefit Appalachia.   
 The theme that energy investment brings coal center-stage but coal is not the only cause 
of Appalachia’s economic fluctuation illustrates that the ARC discourse presents a mixed 
message about coal. However, the ARC is content on describing coal at the regional level. By 
doing this the ARC overlooks the local sub-regional influence of coal. The ARC does include 
research in their annual reports that would allow them to analyze subregions such as Central 
Appalachia, but the ARC does not include such analysis.  
 This oversight has opened a door for this study. By finding this gap in knowledge, this 
study acts as a call to arms, for research on the impacts of coal in the ARC’s discourse, at the sub-
regional level. Also, by concluding that the ARC has minimized coal in its discourse after 1984, 
this study is able to be a guide post, to the ARC that it is starting stray from its energy investment 
goals. Straying from energy investment goals may not be the worst thing to do, but by not 
addressing the social and economic impacts of coal on the sub-regional level, the ARC is 
restricting the economic development efforts of these communities.   
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 As I have mentioned after 1984 the ARC’s discourse starts to change. This is where the 
last two themes come into play. Both community involvement and economic diversification were 
needed areas of concentration for the ARC but they came with a steep price. The price was the 
loss of the discussion of coal and the other traditional Appalachian industries. When the ARC 
states they used community inputs on new policies it is unclear how deep they went, meaning that 
if the ARC does not include abstracts or research from community meeting, one cannot tell if 
community inputs are being used. Since organizations like Kentuckians for the Commonwealth 
and Mountain Justice have been encouraging community support against coal company power 
and increased surface mining, the ARC has a pool of experienced community organizers to draw 
from. Also, these organizations have a large base in the Appalachian coal region, which would 
have attended the ARC’s community focus groups and town hall meetings. By not consulting or 
showing that these organizations were consulted the ARC is not serving the people of 
Appalachia.    
 Since 1984, when the ARC talked about economic diversification, its discourse has 
emphasized tourism and the service sector. In time, the ARC stated that the service sector did not 
provide the same level of pay and benefits as traditional heavy industry jobs but the ARC is still 
pushing tourism for the region. The problem is that tourism is just a specialized branch of the 
service sector. By pushing tourism and the service sector the ARC may be restricting the 
economic strength of the region. The ARC is using tourism and the service sector as a strategy for 
breaking the single-minded reliance on energy resources but in doing so the ARC is just shifting 
the single-mindedness to tourism and the service sector. The ARC does this by changing its 
discourse, so that coal and other heavy industries are no longer mentioned. Also, many of the 
added service sector jobs are in food service, retail, and hospitality services.  
These jobs often do not provide the same level of pay or benefits as coal mining. This can 
limit economic attainment. To its credit however, the ARC, in its push toward service sector jobs 
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has also provided development funds for local small businesses, which include local crafts, 
farmer’s markets, and locally owned merchandise shops. This is because by supporting locally 
owned and operated businesses more of the profit stays in the region and the local community is 
able to thrive on the increased tax base and locally available goods.  
 The ARC, like any other government agency, is subject to the elected officials in charge 
and public option. When President Reagan took office in 1980 he did not push national energy 
development because the energy crisis was ending. This meant that in Appalachia, the ARC no 
longer invested large amounts of time and funds in energy development, which marked the end of 
coal as major part of ARC discourse. After the energy crisis was over the majority of the United 
States public became increasingly uninterested in national energy development, because foreign 
oil was once again cheap and abundant. This led the ARC to change its discourse to community 
involvement and economic diversification in order to meet the national pattern of development 
and shifting public interests.  
 It would appear that coal’s place in the ARC is an uneasy one. Coal is seen as both a 
problem and a blessing. When the demand for coal is high, so is the ARC’s attention to how it 
can benefit the region. Yet, when the demand is low, the ARC’s position is not as clear. Prior to 
1984 the annual reports did provide some evidence that coal is a leading cause of poverty in the 
region, while stating that increased coal production must be managed in order to balance 
economic gains with social and environmental stability. However, after 1984 the ARC no longer 
spoke of coal as a cause of poverty and did little to balance economic gains with social and 
environmental stability. The ARC did do one thing of note, however. They cut the coverage of 
coal related topic in the annual reports to a bare minimum. This shows that coal’s central place in 
the ARC’s discourse is minimized. By changing how coal is represented in the annual reports, the 
ARC may have changed its discourse in order to keep its federal funding. In time, public opinion 
on coal and its impact on Appalachia may change enough so that the ARC can research this topic 
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no matter which way the political winds are blowing at the federal level. Until then, the ARC can 
only hope for a federal government that has an open policy on what is considered relevant and 
beneficial research.     
6.4 Can a Measure of Coal Production Provide the Needed Analytical Power to Explain the Coal 
Industry’s Impact on Appalachian Kentucky? 
 
 In reviewing question 1 above, I attempted to see if a measure of coal production can 
provide the needed analytical power to explain the coal industry’s impact on Appalachian 
Kentucky. However, the need and the ability to prove it are two different things. During my 
quantitative analysis, I started with two measures of coal production, coal severance tax and tons 
of coal per person in poverty. During my Independent Variable Analysis and EDA I decided to 
cut the variable tons of coal per person in poverty because it correlated highly with coal severance 
tax. Plus, when mapping both of these variables, they appeared to have the same pattern. With 
this in mind, I came to the conclusion that these variables would work similarly in an OLS 
regression.  
 After I ran all three OLS regressions it became clear that coal severance tax did not 
greatly influence poverty in Appalachian Kentucky. This is because coal severance tax was not 
significant in the regression. This means that a measure of coal production did not provide the 
needed analytical power to explain the coal industry’s impact on Appalachian Kentucky. Given 
the fact that poverty measures are based on income, it is not surprising that there was one variable 
that explains nearly 80 percent of poverty in Appalachian Kentucky, in all three regressions. That 
variable is Per Capita Income.  
 In my analysis of the ARC and its annual reports I found that the ARC did see that coal’s 
major role in Appalachia as that of an employer, meaning that the region’s incomes are linked to 
coal production. This means that PCI in Appalachian Kentucky can be seen as an indirect coal 
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production variable. However, these findings are tenuous at best, because of the inherent 
relationship between poverty and income. This means that as long as poverty is measured based 
on income thresholds, income will predict poverty on some level. To address this I did run my 
regressions without PCI, but the results were weak at best. For the 1980 dataset no variables were 
found to be significant and as for datasets 1990 and 2000 only net migration was significant but 
this variable barely explained 20 percent of the relationship with poverty. For a geographer this 
relationship is not strong enough (Burt et al. 2009).    
 In the end, quantifying coal’s impact is as difficult as determining its impact on the ARC 
discourse. There is a relationship between coal and poverty but it runs much deeper than a 
regression analysis can show. Coal seems to be so ingrained in the economy and social structure 
of the region that it is difficult to see coal’s interaction with these systems.      
6.5 Could the Instability of the Coal Industry be a Leading Cause for Poverty and Migration Out 
of the Region between 1980 and 2000? 
 
 The instability of the coal industry would appear to be the greatest cause for poverty and 
migration for Appalachian Kentucky between 1980 and 2000. This is because the analysis of the 
ARC’s annual reports, the independent variable analysis, the three regressions, and the LISA 
analysis all show that the boom and bust of the coal industry does affect poverty and migration. 
These results are not completely original, but they do show that the ARC was unable to change 
the boom and bust nature of the coal industry. By seeing both the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis in agreement it is clear that there is a relationship between instability, poverty, and 
migration. However, the extent to which the ARC is aware of this remains unclear since none of 
the research projects mentioned in the annual reports perform a quantitative study like the one I 
have completed. This is strange because I feel a basic regression analysis would be one of the first 
things an organization such as the ARC would perform, in order to better understand the 
relationship between the socio-economic variables and coal data it has collected.       
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6.6 Relevance of this Study in Contemporary Appalachian Research 
Over the last 47 years the ARC has been the leading institution in Appalachian 
development. In those 47 years the ARC has had some success. However, that success is limited 
to highway development and a few social programs. The goal of this thesis is to provide a 
common ground for both the analysis of the ARC and the analysis of variables that may affect 
poverty in Appalachia. This is needed because it appears that the ARC is unable to address coal’s 
role in Appalachia because of its inability to show the current government, and the nation at large, 
that coal is more than just an energy source. By showing coal’s significance as a social and 
geographic constraint and not just an energy source, the ARC would be able to provide more 
funding on research to analyze coal’s relationship with poverty and migration. However, if the 
ARC is to succeed in this venture it needs to clear the hurdles for government bureaucracy and 
the power and influence of coal lobbyists. This two hurdles are steep but if the ARC can muster 
the support of the not just the people of Appalachia but the nation at large, it has a great chance. 
 By analyzing more aspects of the region both qualitatively and quantitatively I am able to 
provide an analysis of the region that is balanced and more holistic. Since the problems of 
Appalachia have more than one cause and these problems run deep, a holistic and 
interdisciplinary approach is the only way to deal with the problems. The ARC has started this 
process by increasing community involvement, but they need to go further and include all the 
grassroots organizations in the region. By doing this the ARC will be more effective in gathering 
the opinions of people in the region. 
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APPPENDICES 
 
 
A.1: Qualitative Themes and Data Extracts 
 
Themes 
1971-1980 
  Isolation and the road network have set the region apart 
Energy investment brings coal center-stage but coal is not the only cause of 
Appalachia’s economic fluctuation 
1984-2008 
  Community involvement  
  Economic Diversification  
 
Data Extracts  
 
Code Groups 1971-1980 
 
Development Group 
 
Low development – Large areas of relatively dense populations were without adequate roads, a 
barrier to access to services and jobs and an impediment to economic growth (ARC 1971, 5) 
 
Development – Development activity in Appalachia, declared the President’s Appalachian 
Regional Commission in 1964, cannot proceed until the regional isolation has been overcome 
(ARC 1971, 41).  
 
Dependence – Since the ARC came into being in 1965, much of its efforts have been devoted to 
improving the mix of economic activates so that the region can overcome the heavy dependence 
in large areas on extractive industry (ARC 1971, 50). 
 
Treatment – Thus, it can be seen that the ARC is responding to the environmental problems and 
the potential economic gains from recreation pointed to in 1964 (ARC 1971, 50).  
 
Cycle of Poverty – By the late 1950s Appalachia could no longer break out of this circle of 
poverty by itself (ARC 1975, 6).  
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Growth – The employment growth trend produced by Central Appalachia has been somewhat 
inconsistent with the national pattern and that of the other sub-regions (ARC 1975, 22).  
 
Development change – It wasn’t until the Industrial Revolution in the late 1800s that Appalachia 
began to undergo significant socioeconomic change. And the reason was coal (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Stupid Mountain People – Unsophisticated in the ways of the new industrial society, Appalachian 
became not the entrepreneurs but the laborers (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Not just coal – So coal alone was not responsible for the economic depression that beset the 
region. Rather, it was the coal “bust” in combination with significant and concurrent downturns in 
all major segments of the sub-regional economies that plunged Appalachia into so prolonged and 
devastating a decline (ARC 1980, 4).  
 
Growth – The Appalachian population growth in this decade (1970-80) was the largest of any 
recent decade; the rate of growth (11.1%) was just under the national rate of 11.4% (ARC 1980, 
6).  
 
Growth – Among the sub-regions, Southern Appalachia has had the largest growth of population 
in each decade, accelerating from 10% gain in the 1960s to nearly 19% in the 1970s. Northern 
Appalachia, with the largest total population, had the slowest growth, only 0.3% in the 1960s, and 
only 4% in the past decade. Central Appalachia lost 7% in the 1960s, but reversed the highest 
growth rate, 21%, in the 1970s (ARC 1980, 6)   
 
Income – Central Appalachia, the sub-region with the lowest per capita personal income level, 
experienced the most rapid increase – from 52 to 71% of the U.S. average over the thirteen years 
(1965-1979) (ARC 1980, 7). 
 
Road Network Group 
 
Transportation Network– its cities and town, its areas of natural wealth and its areas of recreation 
and industrial potential must be penetrated be a transportation network which provides access to 
and from the rest of the nation and within the region itself (ARC 1971, 41).  
 
Mountain Barrier – No analysis of the regional problem has failed to identify the historic and 
persisting barrier-effect of its mountain chains as a primary factor in Appalachian 
underdevelopment (ARC 1971, 41).    
 
Bypassed – When the interstate highway system was developed over the past decade and a half, 
the major routes through the land in the region – I-70. I-40, I-81, and I-75 – tended to follow the 
well-established corridors and did not open up isolated, but heavily populated areas which had 
been historically bypassed by adequate roads (ARC 1971, 41).  
 
Access – There is evidence that the primary purpose of this highway system – long-range 
economic development of the region – is being accomplished. For example, new industrial plants 
have appeared in the region, and the majority of these plants have been located within a few 
minutes of the new highways (ARC 1975, 2). 
 
Limited Development – Limited access to the region discouraged new investments. Narrow, 
winding roads distorted time-distance travel, inhibiting potential industrial developers because of 
the problems involved in getting products to market (ARC 1975, 6).  
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Lack of roads – Poor transportation also directly affected the lives of the citizens by limiting their 
access to existing human services and isolating them from the social and cultural changes taking 
place in the rest of the country (ARC 1975, 6). 
 
Isolation – And there was the one factor that strapped the economy of the entire region: isolation. 
The same narrow twisting roads that limited Appalachian’s social and cultural horizons and their 
access to education, health care, and other vital services, also discouraged new industrial 
development of any kind (ARC 1979, 4).   
 
Isolation – The same narrow twisting roads that limited Appalachians’ social and cultural 
horizons and their access to education, health care, and other vital services, also discouraged new 
industrial development of any kind (ARC 1980, 4). 
 
Access – The Interstate Highway System that was to link the nation coast to coast skirted 
Appalachia in favor of connecting more densely populated urban areas (ARC 1980, 4). 
 
Cost – The cost – many times the national per-mile average – was well beyond the states’ means 
(ARC 1980, 4). 
 
Other means of travel – Railroads were on the decline nationwide, and commercial air service, 
growing rapidly almost everywhere else, skipped over the region (ARC 1980, 4). 
 
Roads – In the energy crises of the 1970s, ARC helped fund access roads to nuclear plants, oil 
storage facilities, and to coal mines (ARC 1980, 17). 
 
Old problem – An old Appalachian problem reemerged with the revival of the coal industry in the 
1970s: the need for building and resurfacing coal haul roads (ARC 1980, 17). 
 
Haul roads – The ARC takes the position that, if the region is to substantially increase its 
production of coal to the benefit of the nation, then the nation must be willing to assume a 
reasonable share of the additional financial outlay necessary to make increased coal production 
possible (ARC 1980, 17). 
 
Invest and Diversify Group 
 
Diversify – Congress expects that the region will generate a diversified industry, and that the 
region will then be able to support itself, through the workings of a strengthened free enterprise 
economy (ARC 1971, 12). 
 
Investment – The act directed that investment be concentrated in areas with a significant potential 
for future growth where the return on the public dollars invested will be the greatest (ARC 1971, 
30).  
 
Directing investment – approximately 60% of the Commissions investments so far have been 
placed in the area with significant potential for future growth. The remaining 40% have been in 
outlying areas to upgrade the health and education of the rural population (ARC 1971, 30).  
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Environment Group 
 
Natural Beauty – Appalachia has natural advantages which might normally have been the base 
for a thriving industrial and commercial complex (ARC 1971, 48). 
 
Beauty does not pay – Yet this natural endowment has benefitted too few of the … people of 
Appalachia… (ARC 1971, 48) 
 
Reclamation – However, a massive job of environmental reclamation is still needed in 
Appalachia. This can only be accomplished if systematic environmental plans for the region are 
developed (ARC 1971, 51).  
 
Impact – These principal and often interrelated impacts include: air pollution from underground 
mine fires and burning waste piles; surface water pollution by silt and acid mine drainage; and 
ground water pollution and land degradation resulting from surface subsidence, unreclaimed 
strip-mines and mining waste piles (ARC 1971, 50).  
 
Spread of pollution – Pollution, like poverty, is not a respector of state border; thus the need for a 
regional approach to the problem (ARC 1971, 52).  
 
Coal/Mining Group 
 
Research – The Commission began a series of studies focused on finding ways to solve the health 
and safety and manpower problems in the coal regions of Appalachia, and on determining the 
effects of various public policies on coal mining industry (ARC 1971, 9).  
 
Mining – Coal mining, past and present, has a damaging effect on the region’s environment (ARC 
1971, 50).  
 
Continuing damage – Damage to the environment still occurs in Kentucky although the state has 
enacted laws to control surface mining of coal (ARC 1971, 51).  
 
Control – Commission contributions included specific provisions for the protection of public and 
private property; provisions for strengthening state governments by placing primary 
responsibilities for regulation and control of mining activities at the state level with the federal 
law and its resultant regulations providing guidelines for such action; and provisions for financial 
assistance to the states for the development, implementation, and enforcement of state programs 
for mining control (ARC 1971, 51-52).  
 
Renewed importance of Coal – The region must learn to use effectively the renewed importance 
of coal, in this period when energy production and distribution are critical in the nation, both to 
fuel its economy and to diversify its industrial base – but, at the same time, to protect the 
Appalachian environment and to preserve the region’s cultural heritage (ARC 1975, 4).  
 
Discovery of Coal – Speculators from the outside were quick to take advantage of unsophisticated 
Appalachians, who did not realize the financial implications of the discovery (ARC 1975, 6). 
 
Mechanization – Lessening demand for coal, coupled with improved technology, closed many 
mines and mechanized others to the point that where many fewer miners were needed to produce 
the same amount of coal (ARC 1975, 6). 
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Coal growth – However, unlike the other two sub-regions and, on average, the nation, Central 
Appalachia did not respond negatively to the recession conditions of 1970-71 (ARC 1975, 22). 
 
No stagnation – Instead of stagnation or an employment decline during this period, Central 
Appalachia experienced a significant acceleration in growth, which continued throughout the 
more expansionary years of 1972-1973 (ARC 1975, 22). 
 
Coal Employment – The mining industry has for many years been a major employer of Central 
Appalachian labor (ARC 1975, 22). 
 
Coal in the ARC – From its beginning, the ARC has recognized that Appalachia’s coal – and its 
other natural resources – are important national assets, and that the region has an obligation to 
develop and use these resources effectively (ARC 1975, 37).  
 
Coal in the ARC – But the ARC has also insisted that this development must take place in a way 
that will improve the quality of life for the people of Appalachia – furnishing new jobs and 
keeping the region’s environmental integrity intact (ARC 1975, 37).  
 
Coal in the ARC – The Senate Public Works Committee has commented that:  
While the crucial energy needs of our country present Appalachia with a new 
opportunity to assist the Nation, there may also be a new responsibility to assist 
the region so as to assure that accelerated coal production will lead to sound 
development, conservation, and self-sustaining economic growth (ARC 1975, 
37).   
 
New coal – Site finding and Infrastructure will identify the promising locations for coal-cleaning, 
-liquefaction, and –gasification plants in Appalachia, and then determines how the building and 
operation of such plants would affect the environment, economy, and social fabric of the areas 
involved (ARC 1975, 38).  
 
Outside control – Most of the industry (coal) was controlled by “outside” interests, as well, so 
that little of the profit remained in the region (ARC 1979, 3).   
 
Unemployed coal miners – Despite the nation’s energy crisis, coal production was down 
considerably, and, as a result, unemployment, among coalminers was on the increase. In nine 
coal-producing counties of West Virginia and Kentucky, 1979 unemployment was estimated at 
10 percent or more (ARC 1979, 7). 
 
Social and Environmental costs – ARC (in 1975) also stated that a national commitment was 
needed to help the region meet the social and environmental costs attendant upon increased 
production of coal (ARC 1979, 32).     
 
Use of Coal – Although coal had long been known to exist in the region (in had in fact been used 
by the Indians before the white man arrived), its extensive use as a source of energy started only 
after the Civil War (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Coal’s importance – with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, coal became the fuel that fired 
the furnaces of the nation (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Stupid Mountain People – Unfortunately, the mountain people didn’t realize the implications of 
their mineral wealth (ARC 1980, 3). 
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Selling – Many sold their land and/or mineral rights for pennies an acre to “outsiders.” (ARC 
1980, 3) 
 
Coming of the Mines – The mines were welcomed nonetheless, for the population, though widely 
scattered, had outgrown the food supply. Mining coal was a needed alternative to squeezing a 
living from the depleted land (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Boom and Bust – Coal quickly became a major industry, particularly in the Central Appalachian 
Mountains. But because the industry was so sensitive to fluctuations in the national economy, it 
also quickly developed a boom-and-bust cycle (ARC 1980, 3).     
 
Little Profit – Most of the industry was controlled by “outside” interests, as well, so that little of 
the profit remained in the region (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
Prolonged bust – When oil fooled the American marketplace in the 1950s, displacing coal as the 
nation’s primary source of energy, Appalachia found itself faced with the prospect of a prolonged 
economic “bust.” (ARC 1980, 3) 
 
Hard Hit – Central Appalachia was hardest hit by the switch from coal to oil because of its 
unique dependence upon mining (ARC 1980, 4).  
 
Righting wrongs – Although the assumption in 1965 was that coal production would continue, 
and even be likely to increase, the ARC gave priority to diversifying economic opportunities, and 
to righting the environmental wrongs that had accumulate over decades of careless mining (ARC 
1980, 32). 
  
Coal as employer – looking at the future of coal in the regional economy, PARC noted the rapid 
rate at which mechanization was reducing mining jobs and concluded that the region could no 
longer rely upon it as a major employer (ARC 1980, 32). 
  
Priority – However, that priority encompasses not only increased production of coal but also the 
associated social and environmental costs; promotion of appropriate new technology; 
transportation costs; and the advocacy of national ARC’s concern for environmental policies 
(ARC 1980, 35). 
 
Isolation Group 
 
Isolation – Appalachia’s potential can never be realized until its isolation in overcome (ARC 
1975, 2) 
 
Population Gaps – Appalachia’ population is generally more scattered than the national 
population. About 45% of the region’s population lived in dispersed locations in 1970, compared 
to a national average of only 22%. The delivery of public services is thus both more difficult and 
more costly in the region than in the nation as a whole (ARC 1975, 4).  
 
Isolation – They fought in the Revolutionary War – probably as much for freedom from the 
imposition of government as for the formation of a new nation. Set apart and independent in their 
mountains, Appalachians had little contact with any form of governance, old or new (ARC 1975, 
5).  
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Transportation – Isolation and Appalachia are almost synonymous. Settlements tend to be 
sparsely scattered in the valley floors or cling tenaciously to the upthrust landscape (ARC 1975, 
28). 
 
ARC and the long road – As a result of all these deterrents, the isolated, but largely populated, 
rural areas of the region were not opened up when the ARC was established in 1965 (ARC 1975, 
28).  
 
Reality – In reality, however, Appalachia existed for generations as a region apart, isolated 
physically and culturally by its impenetrable mountains (ARC 1979, 2).   
 
Isolation – No analysis of the regional problem has failed to identify the historic and persisting 
barrier-effect of its mountains chains as a primary factor in Appalachian underdevelopment (ARC 
1979, 14).  
 
Difference – The Mountains imposed an economy of scarcity and a hardy lifestyle that nurtured 
independence and aversion to rules and regulations (ARC 1980, 3). 
 
Difference – The result was an economic, political, and social structure vastly different from the 
interdependent and relatively prosperous society of the flatlands (ARC 1980, 3). 
 
Hard-to-reach – The most rugged, hard-to-reach part of the region, Central Appalachia had never 
been able to build the economic diversity needed to withstand periodic downturns in its major 
industry (ARC 1980, 4). 
 
Isolation – And there was one factors that strapped the economy of the entire region: isolation 
(ARC 1980, 4).  
 
Isolation – No analysis of the regional problem has failed to identify the historic and persisting 
barrier-effect of its mountains chains as a primary factor in Appalachian underdevelopment (ARC 
1980, 15).  
 
Energy Group  
 
Energy – This research has been used by the Appalachian states, the local development districts, 
various federal agencies and industries in a variety of ways: to help arrive at planning and policy 
decisions; to formulate state laws and regulations; to help plan and carry out environmental 
control projects, and to determine where new energy markets will be (ARC 1975, 2). 
 
Energy crisis – In the current national energy situation, the Appalachian coal industry once again 
has become vitally important to the nation (ARC 1975, 2). 
 
Energy Research – A major study, funded by ARC, the President’s Council on Environmental 
Quality and the National Science Foundation, predicted that coal production in Appalachia will, 
at the least, double – and could quintuple – over the last quarter of this century. The study pointed 
out that the Appalachian states must shape this growth if they are to obtain the greatest benefit 
from it (ARC 1975, 2).  
 
Energy – Today’s national energy crisis has focused attention on Appalachian coal – where it is, 
what its quality and sulfur content are, how to get it out of the ground, how to reclaim the land 
after mining (ARC 1975, 37).  
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No direct involvement – In addition, PARC also recommended against any direct involvement in 
energy production, specifically gas and generation of electricity (ARC 1980, 32). 
 
New involvement – The same year (1975), the Congress amended the ARC’s legislation, 
expanding its authority and responsibilities in the area of energy production. Whit this new 
authority, ARC undertook a series of preliminary studies aimed at accommodating increased 
energy production (ARC 1980, 32). 
 
Energy areas – Three specific areas where the ARC could have the most effect were defined – 
increased production and use of coal, energy conservation, and the development of other 
alternatives to oil (ARC 1980, 33). 
 
Energy areas – While coal is the region’s major energy resource, ARC has not limited its energy 
interests to coal alone (ARC 1980, 33). 
 
Priority – Given the national energy priority, coal continues to be a top regional priority (ARC 
1980, 35). 
 
Historic Group 
 
Past Appalachia – Pride, independence, skepticism, and isolation are reflected in Appalachia’s 
history and folklore, and they remain dominant characteristics of the region’s culture today (ARC 
1975, 5).  
 
Settlement – The majority of those who settled were Scotch, Irish, Welsh, and English – with a 
few Germans and Huguenots (ARC 1975, 5).  
 
People that settled – They were, by and large, a stern people accustomed to hardship and eager to 
find freedom and a new home (ARC 1975, 5). 
 
Divided loyalties – Again, Appalachians Fought in Indian warfare in the old Southwest in the 
early 1800s and later in the Civil War, when divided loyalties resulted in divided states – a severe 
enough division to cause the western counties of Virginia, alienated from the rest of the state by 
mountains and convictions, to move to form the free and separate state of West Virginia (ARC 
1975, 5)   
 
War and Isolation – And again when the wars were over, Appalachians reverted to their 
traditional ways (ARC 1975, 5-6).  
 
Unchanged – From the time the first wave of pioneers challenged the mountain in the early 17th 
century until the Industrial Revolution hit America, the region remained largely unchanged (ARC 
1979, 2).   
 
Why people stayed in the mountains – Here they weren’t answerable to any government or 
hemmed in by too many people too close at hand (ARC 1979, 2).   
 
Why the region became important – When Appalachia did finally capture the nation’s attention, it 
happened almost by accident. In 1960, the Presidential hopefuls waged an intense campaign in 
West Virginia. The national television and press that followed the campaign into the mountains 
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gave America its first intimate look a widespread poverty in the rich nation in the world (ARC 
1979, 5).   
 
Settlement – From the time the first wave of pioneers challenged the mountains in the early 17th 
century until the Industrial Revolution hit America, the region remained largely unchanged (ARC 
1980, 2). 
 
Self-sufficiency – The game and small patches of tillable land provided ample sustenance.  
 
Settlement - Attracted by the self-sufficiency of mountain life, they settled in tiny hollows and 
long marrow valleys (ARC 1980, 2).  
 
Settlement – Here they weren’t answerable to any government or hemmed in by too many people 
too close at hand (ARC 1980, 2).  
 
Involvement – While many fought the war for independence, few sought active roles in the new 
family of states. Later, when the states chose up sides for the Civil War, so did the mountain 
people – but with some unexpected results (ARC 1980, 3).  
 
 
Miscellaneous Group 
 
Migration – One of the most striking changes in Appalachia has been a reversal of is population 
tide: the region is no longer losing population every year (ARC 1975, 1).  
 
Education – Recently, ARC has funded a wide range of career education courses for both the 
secondary and post-secondary student population (ARC 1975, 3). 
 
Exodus – The result was predictable – people left the region en masse (ARC 1975, 6). 
 
Region of contradictions – Appalachia is a region of contradictions. Even the adjectives so often 
used to describe it are paradoxical: rich yet poor; exploited yet underdeveloped; scarred yet 
beautiful (ARC 1979, 2).  
 
Rich in resources but not in wealth – Thrust up between the heavily populated, industrial East 
Coast and the thriving Midwest, Appalachia, with abundant resources and a prime geographic 
location, theoretically should have benefited richly by doing business with its neighbors on both 
sides (ARC 1979, 2).   
 
New power – That same year (1975), the Congress amended the ARC’s legislation, expanding its 
authority and responsibilities in the area of energy production (ARC 1979, 32).   
 
The Place – Thrust up between the heavily populated, industrial East Coast and the thriving 
Midwest, Appalachia, with abundant resources and a prime geographic location, theoretically 
should have benefited richly by doing business with its neighbors on both sides, in reality, 
however, Appalachia existed for generations as a region apart, isolated physically and culturally 
by its impenetrable mountains (ARC 1980, 2).  
 
Poverty – Poverty ran deeper than any unemployment rate could reflect, however. It touched 
every aspect of human existence (ARC 1980, 4).  
 
118 
 
Brain drain – People – among them many of the best educated, most skilled, the young and the 
able-bodied – had left the region in large numbers (ARC 1980, 5). 
 
City live – While many did find work and a new life, others found city life alien, unwelcoming. 
They were generally Central Appalachians, proud mountain people who environmental and 
cultural heritage made them oddities in an urban is setting (ARC 1980, 5) 
 
Outmigration – In the 1950-60 decade, the region lost one-eight of its population by outmigration 
(ARC 1980, 6). 
 
Code Groups 1984-2008 
 
Development Group 
 
Critical needs – Using its area development appropriation of $43 million, the ARC made 
significant gains for the second year in targeting three broad areas: creating and retaining jobs in 
the region, giving special assistance to Appalachia’s neediest counties, and improving health care 
(ARC 1984, 1). 
 
Budget cuts – ARC’s finish-up program is the result of a plan designed by the Appalachian 
governors in 1981 in response to a Reagan Administration proposal that the ARC be terminated 
immediately (ARC 1984, 1). 
 
Slow to recover – One of the major reasons that the region has persistently higher unemployment 
rates than the nation is that Appalachia still has disproportionately high levels of coal-mining and 
manufacturing employment and disproportionately low levels of employment in the services 
sector, which seems to be relatively immune to the ups and downs of the business cycle (ARC 
1984, 5). 
Drop off – Coal and old-line manufacturing activities such as primary metals, lumber, stone, clay, 
and glass, textiles, and apparel are particularly subject to foreign competition and are usually 
affected by any overall decline in economic activities nationally (ARC 1984, 1). 
 
Service industry – High levels of services employment are usually associated with high levels of 
urbanization – a fact that explains why the region, which is significantly less urbanized than the 
nation, seems to have a relatively lower level of business, financial, and personal services 
activities (ARC 1984, 5). 
 
Distressed – Since 1983, ARC has provided special funds for the region’s poorest counties. In FY 
1988, 90 counties qualified for distressed county status on the basis of low per capita income and 
high rates of poverty and unemployment. As in past years, the program focuses on providing 
badly needed public facilities, especially systems to furnish clean drinking water and waste 
disposal to maintain a healthier environment. Under previous program guidelines, most of these 
counties were too poor to qualify for federal assistance to fund these facilities (ARC 1988, 8). 
 
What is the ARC – ARC-funded programs include construction of an interstate-quality highway 
system, education and job training, health care, water and sewer systems, housing, and other 
essentials of comprehensive economic development (ARC 1995, 3).  
 
Building blocks – As the year ended, the planning process had begun to identify new directions in 
such areas as transportation, education, health care, technology, infrastructure, and leadership – 
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the building blocks of economic development that ARC will use to help make the people of 
Appalachia more self-reliant and the region’s local economies self-sustaining (ARC 1995, 5).   
 
Economy – The region has been battered by structural economic shifts because it’s 
disproportionate reliance on extractive industries and manufacturing (ARC 2004, 26). 
 
Road Network Group 
 
Reduce isolation – Reduced the region’s isolation by opening nearly 2,500 miles of new, modern 
highways, which represent approximately 80% of the Appalachian Development Highway 
System (ADHS). The ADHS replaces a network of worn, narrow, winding two-lane roads that 
snaked through narrow stream valleys or over high, rugged mountain (ARC 2004, 11).  
 
Invest and Diversify Group 
 
Regional Program Initiatives – Education programs tailored to the needs of expanding small 
business, tourism, the service sector, or other industries (ARC 1988, 7). 
 
Area Economic and Human Resource Development – Encouraging the creation, retention or 
expansion of commercial, industrial, agricultural, forestry, and service enterprises (ARC 1988, 6).   
 
Diversifying Appalachia – Thirty-seven local development districts brought to the meeting the 
home-grown products of 234 Appalachian manufactures, including such diverse items as shoes, 
pasta, outboard motors, machine tools and fine wines. The purpose of the exposition was to 
demonstrate the capacity of the largely rural Appalachian Region to compete with any other 
region in the nation in the quality and variety of its products (ARC 1988, 4).  
   
Tourism – A major focus for economic development in many Appalachian States is tourism 
(ARC 1991, 4).  
 
Tourism – ARC has recently begun to explore new ways to promote the region’s powerful beauty 
and rich cultural history (ARC 1988, 7). 
 
Extractive – The member states of the ARC are interested in increasing “value added” 
employment as an alternative to employment in the traditional extraction and export of raw 
materials. Studies that focus in depth on individual industries are an ongoing part of the ARC 
research program (ARC 1988, 15). 
 
Progress – The ARC celebrated its 30th anniversary year in 1995 by launching a top-to-bottom 
strategic planning process. We went into the region and listened to more than 2,000 Appalachian. 
Though four interstate town meetings, 13 focus-group discussions, nine consultations, and 
extensive research, we learned our region anew – the hopes, dreams, challenges, and 
opportunities our communities embrace (ARC 1995, 5).  
 
Decline – With employment levels in Appalachia’s traditional economic sectors of apparel 
manufacturing, mining, textiles, and steel continuing to decline this past year, the Commission 
worked to help the region develop the skills and infrastructure it needs to be economically 
competitive today and in the future (ARC 2004, 6) 
 
Jobs – Employment losses in non-durable goods and manufacturing and resource-based industries 
have been severe and have disproportionately impacted much of the region (ARC 2004, 26). 
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Jobs – Some of these declines have been offset by employment growth in service sectors, but 
service-sector average wages are often considerably lower than those in the goods-producing 
sector (ARC 2004, 26). 
 
New economy – Complementing the tourism grant competitions was the March release of the new 
Driving Tours Appalachia map, created in partnership with the National Geographic Society. The 
map distributed in the April issue of National Geographic Traveler magazine as well as to target 
audiences in the Region, features 28 
Appalachian driving trails including a broad array of historical, archaeological, cultural, and 
scenic sites. A companion Web site, www.visitappalachia.com, offers downloadable maps of the 
driving tours and other features to help travelers plan driving vacations in Appalachia (ARC 
2008, 5). 
 
Environment Group 
 
Environment – The EPA and the ARC worked together to inform Appalachian communities 
about economic development funds available under EPA’s “brownfields” clean-up program 
(ARC 1999, 6). 
 
Environmental cleanup – The U.S. EPA and the ARC signed a formal agreement to work 
together to inform Appalachian communities about the availability of economic development 
funds under EPA’s “brownfields” clean-up program. The goal is to help rural Appalachian 
communities clean up and reuse contaminated, abandoned areas such as rail yards, former 
gasoline stations, factories, lumber mills, and food processing plants (ARC 2000, 5). 
 
Environment – Three of the six communities targeted in EPA’s new Brownfields Federal 
Partnership Mine-Scarred Lands Initiative are in Appalachian areas of Virginia, West Virginia, 
and Pennsylvania (ARC 2004, 6). 
 
Coal/Mining Group 
 
Coal Mining – Appalachian coal-mining employment has fallen from 101,500 workers in 1987 to 
46,000 in 2003, largely because of productivity gains. The Energy Information Administration 
has projected that over the next decade, mining jobs in Appalachia could fall to as low as 22,000, 
or even lower (ARC 2004, 26). 
 
Coal Mining – Appalachian coal-mining employment experienced a slight recovery in 2005, 
when total employment rose to over 53,000 jobs, up from 49,000 in 2004. However, more recent 
state data indicate some retrenchment in 2006, especially in central Appalachia (ARC 2008, 25). 
 
Energy Group  
 
New Energy – In July, the Commission selected nine projects for funding through a grant 
competition intended to help communities revitalize their economies by leveraging renewable-
energy and energy-efficiency resources. This funding, totaling $546,000 is in addition to the 
$605,000 provided to 12 projects through a similar grant competition in FY 2007, for a total of 
almost $1.2 million in energy-related grants. The projects funded will help advance the 
production and use of renewable-energy products, such as biofuels, biomass, and solar or wind 
energy; expand the start-up of “clean energy” businesses; and promote the use of energy-efficient 
buildings (ARC 2008, 5). 
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New energy initiative – We are pleased to note that in FY 2008, Congress completed work on 
legislation reauthorizing the Commission for the next five years, through FY 2012. The 
legislation renews ARC’s existing authorities and establishes a new economic and energy 
development initiative to focus on the creation of energy-related job opportunities as outlined in 
ARC’s 2006 energy “blueprint,” Energizing Appalachia: A Regional Blueprint for Economic and 
Energy Development. The legislation also requires the designation of economically “at-risk” 
counties in the Appalachian Region and permits ARC to fund up to 70 percent of the cost of 
projects in those counties. In addition, it stipulates that earmarks come out of the Appalachian 
states’ funding allocations, and it adds ten counties to the Region (effective in FY 2009). 
President George W. Bush signed the legislation into law on October 8, 2008 (ARC 2008, 7). 
 
Isolation Group 
 
Isolation – The region’s isolation and difficulty in adapting to changes over the past decades and 
in retooling to be competitive are major factors contributing to the gap in living standards and 
economic achievement between the region and the rest of the country (ARC 2004, 26). 
 
Miscellaneous Group 
 
President to Appalachia – Your visit to eastern Kentucky with ARC Federal Co-Chairman Jesse 
White and Kentucky Governor Paul E. Patton represented the first time in more than three 
decades that a president has come to Appalachia to address its economic potential (ARC 1999, 5). 
 
What was done – During FY 2000, ARC devoted much of its energy to building a consensus for 
an expanded program to help Appalachia’s remaining economically distressed counties become 
more competitive. In, addition, the Commission focused on identifying new partners to spur 
development of more homegrown businesses in Appalachia and engaged in a number of other 
collaborative efforts to benefit the region (ARC 2000, 5).  
 
More meetings – The Commission conducted community meeting from May through August in 
seven states. More than 750 people attended the meetings, including three Appalachian governors 
and the ARC federal co-chairman (ARC 2000, 5). 
 
Community – Using an approach that drew on citizen participation, ARC identified 32 key issues 
facing the region and polled some 1,000 community leaders and citizens in five field forums on 
their significance (ARC 2004, 8).  
 
Priorities over time – Early, pioneering programs included initiatives in environmental cleanup, 
hospital construction, vocational education, and rural health care (ARC 2004, 16). 
 
Priorities over time – These were followed by various initiatives in business development, 
telecommunication infrastructure, and tourism development (ARC 2004, 16). 
Priorities over time – Throughout the years, ARC has consistently maintained a focus on the 
construction of development highways and basic water and waste management facilities (ARC 
2004, 16). 
 
Recent economic focus – Accordingly, ARC has emphasized a wide-ranging set of priorities in its 
grant activities. Projects in recent years have focused on business development, 
telecommunications and technology infrastructure and use, educational attainment, access to 
health care, and tourism development. ARC has consistently maintained a focus on the 
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construction of development highways and basic water and waste management facilities (ARC 
2008, 15). 
 
Ageing - Demographic shifts between 1990 and 2000 have led to a decline in the Region’s share 
of the “prime-age” workforce, or those between the ages 25 and 55, who are entering or reaching 
their peak earnings potential. Erosion of this segment of the workforce has contributed to the 
reversal of the Region’s gains in per capita income, and at the local level has led to declines in the 
tax base. Meanwhile, the Region still confronts significant concentrations of high poverty, 
unemployment, low income, and outmigration (ARC 2004, 26). 
 
 
A.2: Metadata 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
1. Poverty Rate for 1980, 1990, and 2000 - This variable was obtained directly from the 
ARC. The ARC describes poverty rate as the ratio of persons below poverty level to the total 
number of persons for whom poverty status has been determined (2010).  
 
Independent Variables 
 
1. Percent of the population with a high school diploma or higher 1980, 1990, and 2000 – 
This variable was obtained directly from the ARC. The ARC describes percent of the population 
with a high school diploma or higher as the percentage of adults, 25 years and over, completing 
12 years or more of school (2010). 
 
2. Median Age 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable was obtained directly from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2010). Median age is a measure that divides the age distribution in a stated area 
into two equal parts: one-half of the population falling below the median value and one-half 
above the median value (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).    
 
3. Tons of coal per person in poverty 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable is a ratio of tons 
of coal produced to the total number of persons for whom poverty status has been determined.    
 
4. Average Coal Severance Tax receipts for 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable is a ratio 
of tons of coal produced to coal price per ton to coal tax. I have also adjusted PCI for inflation in 
the year 2003. I chose the year 2003 because 2003 was the last year available to use for the 
NASA inflation calculator.        
 
5. Percent of unemployment 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable was obtained directly 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010).  Unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons 
as a percentage of the civilian labor force (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).   
 
6. Per Capita Income (PCI) 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable was obtained directly 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010). This measure of income is calculated as the personal 
income of the residents of a given area divided by the resident population of the area (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2010). I have also adjusted PCI for inflation in the year 2003. I chose the year 
2003 because 2003 was the last year available to use for the NASA inflation calculator.    
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7. Net Migration Rate for 1980, 1990, and 2000 – This variable was obtained directly from 
Fuguitt et al. (2010) for 2000, Voss et al. (2005) for 1990, and White et al. (1987) for 1980. Net 
migration is the difference between the number of people moving into an area and the number 
moving out over time. These three projects measured net migration using the residual method, 
which is net migration is equal to the population change over the period minus the natural 
increase (births-deaths) (Fuguitt et al. 2010, Voss et al. 2005, White et al. 1987).      
 
A.3: EDA Background Data 
 
Regression Assumptions 
 
Tables 7-9 are intended to address assumption 1 for datasets 1980, 1990, and 2000. By 
knowing if the variables are normal I know if an OLS regression fits the data. This is because 
OLS is a linear regression model and needs normal variables to be affective. Also, throughout the 
rest of section 5.3 when a significance level is shown, I accept it if it met my preselected alpha of 
.05. I have chosen .05 as my alpha level because it is a common standard for the social sciences 
(Montello and Sutton 2006). 
In Table 7 there are three variables that are normal according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and there are two variables that are normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test. For 
the 1980 dataset it is clear that Median Age and Unemployment are normal because both tests 
confirm it. However, the question is with PCI. I have chosen to accept PCI as normal because it is 
confirmed by at least one test. I use the same rule for the 1990 and 2000 datasets. 
In Table 8 there are three variables that are normal according to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and there are three variables that are normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test. For 
the 1990 dataset it is clear that Median Age and Net Migration Rate are linear because both tests 
confirm it. PCI and Unemployment are normal in one test. 
In Table 9 there are two variables that are normal according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test and two variables that are normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test. For the 2000 dataset it 
is clear that Unemployment and Net Migration Rate are linear because both tests confirm it. 
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Table 7: PASW Normality Results Table for 1980 Dataset  
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
1. PovRate80 0.070 54 0.200* 0.989 54 0.890 
2. PctHSorhigher80 0.165 54 0.001 0.902 54 0.000 
3.TonsPerPersonInPov80 0.346 54 0.000 0.608 54 0.000 
4. AjCoalTax80 0.340 54 0.000 0.521 54 0.000 
5. AjPerCapIn80 0.105 54 0.200* 0.933 54 0.005 
6. MedAge80 0.056 54 0.200* 0.980 54 0.496 
7. AvgUnEmployRate80 0.067 54 0.200* 0.981 54 0.532 
8. NetMigRate80 0.119 54 0.055 0.941 54 0.100 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction       * This is a lower bound of the true significance 
 
 
Table 8: PASW Normality Results Table for 1990 Dataset  
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
1. PovRate90 0.084 54 0.200* 0.981 54 0.558 
2. PctHSorhigher90 0.120 54 0.051 0.936 54 0.006 
3.TonsPerPersonInPov90 0.382 54 0.000 0.543 54 0.000 
4. AjCoalTax90 0.375 54 0.000 0.460 54 0.000 
5. AjPerCapIn90 0.102 54 0.200* 0.947 54 0.019 
6. MedAge90 0.088 54 0.200* 0.972 54 0.241 
7. AvgUnEmployRate90 0.127 54 0.029 0.958 54 0.055 
8. NetMigRate90 0.065 54 0. 200* 0.972 54 0.225 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction       * This is a lower bound of the true significance 
 
 
Table 9: PASW Normality Results Table for 2000 Dataset 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
1. PovRate00 0.059 54 0.200* 0.991 54 0.949 
2. PctHSorhigher00 0.147 54 0.005 0.931 54 0.004 
3.TonsPerPersonInPov00 0.392 54 0.000 0.508 54 0.000 
4. AjCoalTax00 0.373 54 0.000 0.444 54 0.000 
5. AjPerCapIn00 0.107 54 0.182 0.942 54 0.011 
6. MedAge00 0.125 54 0.035 0.924 54 0.002 
7. AvgUnEmployRate00 0.099 54 0.200* 0.962 54 0.086 
8. NetMigRate00 0.091 54 0. 200* 0.975 54 0.327 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction       * This is a lower bound of the true significance 
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1980 
 
Figure 53: PASW Histogram of 1980 Stepwise Regression Residuals 
 
 Figure 53 shows the distribution of regression residuals. A normal distribution confirms 
that the regression model is a good fit for the dataset. As Figure 53 shows, the residuals are 
normally distributed for the 1980 dataset.    
Figure 54: Homoscedasticity Test 1980  
 
 Figure 54 is the last figure in this subsection and is intended to answer assumption 3. 
Figure 54 shows that there is slight heteroscedasticity. This is due to the points on the left side of 
the graph. However, I feel that the rest of the points show homogeneity of variance and I can 
move to the next dataset.  
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1990  
Figure 55: PASW Histogram of 1990 Stepwise Regression Residuals 
 
Figure 55 shows the residuals are normally distributed for the 1990 dataset. This normal 
distribution confirms that the regression model is a good fit for the dataset.  
 
Figure 56: Homoscedasticity Test 1990 
 
Figure 56 shows that there is heteroscedasticity. This is due to the points on the left side 
of the graph. However, feel that the rest of the points show homogeneity of variance and I can 
move to the next dataset. 
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2000 
 
Figure 57: PASW Histogram of 2000 Stepwise Regression Residuals 
 
Figure 57 shows the residuals are normally distributed for the 2000 dataset. This normal 
distribution confirms that the regression model is a good fit for the dataset.  
 
Figure 58: Homoscedasticity Test 2000  
 
Figure 58 shows that there is heteroscedasticity. This is due to the points on the left side 
of the graph. However, feel that the rest of the points show homogeneity of variance. 
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discourse analysis to discover coal’s role in the ARC’s discourse. Ordinary Least Squares 
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Appalachian Kentucky.  
 
Findings and Conclusions: 
 
During the course of my research I found four key themes that help to explain the 
ARC’s discourse. These four themes are: (1) isolation and the road network have set the 
region apart; (2) energy investment brings coal center-stage but coal is not the only cause 
of Appalachia’s economic fluctuation; (3) community involvement; and (4) economic 
diversification. After analyzing these four themes my conclusion is that coal has an 
important role in the ARC’s discourse, as long as coal is important at the national level. 
Also, this study highlights a shift in the ARC’s discourse in 1984, which moves the 
agency away from detailed analysis of the coal industry. 
According to my findings, coal’s influence on poverty and migration in 
Appalachian Kentucky is minimal. During my OLS regression I discovered that a direct 
coal variable, such as the coal severance tax, is not significant in determining poverty. 
The variable that provides the most explanation is per capita income. This relationship 
confirms the commonly held fact that poverty and income are related. However, these 
results do show that there is instability in the region and this instability contributes to 
poverty in Appalachian Kentucky.  
This thesis provides a common ground for both the analysis of the ARC’s 
discourse and the analysis of variables that may affect poverty in Appalachia. By 
showing coal’s significance as a social and geographic constraint and not just an energy 
source, this study supplies information the ARC may be able to use to provide a more 
balanced assessment of how coal impacts the region. 
